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Ripples on the Water? The Acoustics of Geoffrey 
Chaucer’s House of Fame and the Influence of Robert 
Holcot 
 
The second book of Chaucer’s dream-vision poem, The House of Fame, begins with 
the arrival of a huge golden eagle, who swoops down, seizes the dreaming poet in his 
claws, and carries him off skywards. 1 The bird eventually introduces himself as the 
envoy of “the god of thonder/ Which that men callen Jupiter” (608–609); and he 
explains he has been sent by Jupiter to take Chaucer to a place called “the House of 
Fame”, where the poet will be able to overhear a marvellous profusion of all the 
various things ever spoken by or about lovers (lines 661–698). The Eagle clearly 
expects the poet to be delighted by this prospect of so privileged an insight into the 
experiences of “Loves folke” (675). However, as it turns out, Chaucer’s persona in 
the poem flatly refuses to believe even in the existence of the House of Fame, 
frankly doubting that so many sounds could ever be collected in one place: “For hyt/ 
Were impossible,” he insists, that Fame “shulde here al this” (701–705). Apparently 
rather piqued by this disappointingly unenthusiastic (and indeed rather ungracious) 
response, the Eagle is moved to try to prove that the existence of such a place is an 
 
1  Geoffrey Chaucer, The House of Fame: ed. John M. Fyler, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. 
Benson (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 347–73; ed. Nick Havely in Geoffrey Chaucer: The 
House of Fame, 2nd edition, Durham Medieval and Renaissance Texts (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2013). All quotations here from the House of Fame are from 
Havely’s 2013 edition. 
entirely logical deduction, not from any particular textual precedent (as the 
predominantly literary concerns of the poem up to this point might have led one to 
expect), but from the principles of acoustics. Rather than insisting on his authority as 
the ambassador of the gods, the Eagle apparently chooses to interpret Chaucer’s 
scepticism about the possibility of so many sounds being gathered in one place as a 
challenge to his authority as a physicist. Accordingly, he seems to believe that if he 
can convince the poet (and perhaps implicitly the poet’s readers) of his credibility as 
an expert on the laws of sound, then Chaucer’s persona within the poem (and, by 
extension, we the readers of the poem) will also accept the reality of the House of 
Fame. Yet how convincing is the Eagle’s lecture on acoustics meant to be? Are we 
really supposed to treat this lengthy disquisition within the context of a fantastic 
dream-vision as an up-to-date and scientifically accurate account of the mechanics of 
the natural world? In any case, what would the science of physics have looked like to 
an educated layman (like Chaucer) in the second half of the fourteenth century? 
What models of the principles of sound were actually available to him? And are any 
of the choices that the Eagle makes among them significant for our understanding of 
the horizons of Chaucer’s scientific knowledge?  
In the course of attempting to answer these broad questions, I am going to 
propose a new source for one of the key moments in the Eagle’s lecture on 
acoustics, the analogy with ripples created by a stone thrown into a body of water (in 
Section III below). To be more precise, I will argue for the primary importance to 
this section of the House of Fame of a source which is not exactly ‘new’ – having long 
lurked at the fringes of Chaucerian scholarship’s consciousness – but which has 
never been seriously considered as a decisive influence on the Eagle’s analysis of 
sound. This source is the Wisdom-commentary of the Dominican friar, Robert Holcot 
(ca. 1290–1349). It seems to me that the probable presence of this text in Chaucer’s 
mind at this point in The House of Fame invites a fundamental reconsideration of the 
way in which the English poet received – and used for literary effect – ideas about 
natural science. In Section IV, I provide an account of the central, and perhaps even 
pivotal, position occupied by Holcot in the intellectual history of the fourteenth 
century. However, before even attempting to define Holcot’s influence on the 
Eagle’s acoustics, or to discuss the relevance of this to any assessment of Chaucer’s 
indebtedness to fourteenth-century intellectual culture, it seems to me necessary to 
preface this with an account of what seem to be the prevailing assumptions about the 
sources of Chaucer’s physics: in particular, the supposition that Chaucer’s 
understanding of natural science is, in essence, so profoundly and conventionally 
‘Aristotelian’ as to leave little room for the identification of any distinctively 
fourteenth-century contributions it (see Section I). Such assumptions have been 
challenged before, with Chaucer’s physics being portrayed as much more ‘cutting-
edge’ than is generally assumed, but only on the basis of arguments that have not 
been subjected to sufficient scrutiny (see Section II). The possibility of Holcot’s 
direct influence on the Eagle’s account of the principles of acoustics is perhaps most 
significant for what it tells us about how Chaucer mediated between these 
alternatives – in effect pretending to participate in the grand and venerable tradition 
of scientific speculation about the natural world only by making use of ideas that had 
already been given a distinct moral/rhetorical shape by a relatively near 
contemporary. 
 
I.  THE ‘ARISTOTELIAN’ EAGLE? 
It might be useful to begin with a summary of what the Eagle actually says: how, that 
is, he goes about attempting to justify his claim to authority as a natural scientist. 
Everything in the universe, the Eagle argues, is governed by a principle of attraction, 
such that every object has a natural tendency, a “kyndely enclynynge”, to move 
towards a particular point: a “kyndely stede” (729–36). So, for example, anything 
made of a heavy substance like stone or lead will always fall downwards once it is 
released (737–41), and conversely light things like fire or sound or smoke naturally 
move upwards, “seke upwarde on hight” (742–46). Similarly, every river is 
“enclyned” to run towards the sea; fish can only survive in water; and trees need to 
be rooted in the earth (747–52). What these instances illustrate, according to the 
Eagle, is the principle that every kind of thing has its own proper place in the 
universe: “every thinge, by thys reson,/ Hath his propre mansyon/ To which it 
seketh to repaire” (753–55); and he emphasises that this is an opinion familiar in 
“every philosophres mouthe”, not just Aristotle and Plato, but also “other clerkys, 
many oon” (757–60). Speech, moreover, is only a form of sound, and it is therefore 
governed by just the same rules that govern the behaviour of sound in general. All 
sounds, the Eagle says, should be understood as disturbances in the air: as “eyre y-
broken” (765). This includes speech (765–66), but the breaking of air can be effected 
“in many wise”, so that the sounds made by pipes or harps, say, are very different 
(771–80). The movements of sound are analogous to the ripples on a body of water 
after a stone has been thrown into it (787–815). Just as ripples multiply in water, so 
too sound keeps on multiplying until, inevitably, it reaches the House of Fame (816–
21). Since every thing is “enclyned” to move towards its proper place (its “kyndelych 
stede”, 823–42), and since the House of Fame is particularly capable of receiving 
sound (being “most conservatyf the soun”, 843–47), then the inevitable conclusion is 
that “every speche of every man” moves “kyndely to Fames place” (848–52). In 
other words, the eventual arrival of all tidings at the House of Fame is not at all so 
“impossible” as the Chaucer’s persona in the poem immediately assumes, but a 
necessary deduction from some of the most basic principles of medieval physics. 
Admittedly, there is at least an amusing tension between the sheer earnestness and 
elaboration of this long discussion of the physical properties of sound, and the 
strangeness of the circumstances in which it is imagined to take place. If nothing else, 
it is at least ironic that the limits of what is physically “impossible” are discussed so 
thoroughly in the course of a conversation with an enormous talking bird. Indeed, 
one might have expected the poet to have been a little more willing to believe in the 
Eagle’s account of the wonders of the House of Fame, given that the Eagle himself 
presents such an impressive contradiction of the ordinary rules of possibility. 
Certainly, Chaucer actually goes out of his way to emphasise the comedy of this 
encounter between the bird and his own persona within the poem.2 When the Eagle 
first addresses ‘Chaucer’ it is only to complain about how uncomfortable he is to 
carry (573–74), which should presumably be taken as a joke at the expense of the 
poet’s waistline. The narrator-figure himself is preoccupied with the concern that he 
might be on the point of being “stellifye[d]” (586): transformed into a star, that is, 
like so many figures in classical mythology (and in Ovid’s Metamorphoses in particular). 
But this only suggests a rather exaggerated view of his own significance, as well as a 
 
2  A.J. Minnis describes the Eagle with provocative concision as “Chaucer’s funny fowl” (Oxford 
Guides to Chaucer: The Shorter Poems (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 201). 
degree of pusillanimity. Throughout his journey in the Eagle’s claws, in fact, 
‘Chaucer’ cuts an amusingly self-centred, testy figure – altogether more Arthur Dent 
than Dante 3  – and it is perhaps implicit that his terse rejection of the Eagle’s 
description of the wonders of the House of Fame is not so much a serious challenge 
to his guide’s scientific authority as a convenient way of giving vent to his irritation at 
finding himself in the undignified position of being in the Eagle’s claws in the first 
place. Yet, despite the comedy implicit in the exchanges between the bird and its 
passenger, the description of the physics of sound to which they lead seems to be 
anything but frivolous. The Eagle’s account of the movements of sound is 
painstakingly thorough and exact. There is nothing intrinsically comical about the 
substance of what he says, despite the ironies created by its context. Indeed, it could 
be argued that those ironies are only deepened by the fact that the Eagle’s speech is 
so determinedly sober. By his own estimation at least, what he has to say about the 
physics of sound seems to amount to a rational and philosophically coherent account 
of the mechanisms of the natural world.  
Perhaps the best way of explaining the odd combination of weightiness and 
whimsy that characterises the conversation between ‘Chaucer’ and the Eagle is to see 
the Eagle’s whole speech as an exercise in pastiche: that is, as a deliberately and 
playfully imitative use of an identifiably distinct mode of discourse for comical, but 
not necessarily satirical, effect. However, seeing the Eagle’s speech in this way only 
intensifies the question of what particular discourses, cultural traditions, or 
“authorities” he might be said to be imitating. After all, pastiche is generally most 
effective when its mimicry is most accurate and well-informed. If the Eagle is, in 
 
3  For comparison of Chaucer’s Eagle with Dante’s, see Minnis, Oxford Guides, 202. 
effect, pretending to be an expert in the physics of sound, what kind of expert 
exactly is he pretending to be? The Eagle himself suggests an answer to this question 
when he cites Aristotle, Plato and “other clerkys, many oon” (759–60). Aristotle is 
explicitly the first of the authorities cited by the bird, and even though it is 
emphasised that Aristotle’s opinions were shared by Plato and many other 
philosophers, it is certainly true that nearly all of Eagle’s ideas can be found in 
Aristotle’s works. For example, the suggestion that “every thinge […]/ Hath his 
propre mansyon” (753–54) is apparently a version of Aristotle’s analysis of “the 
locomotions of the elementary natural bodies – namely, fire, earth, and the like”, in 
terms of a certain kind of “influence”, whereby “each [element] is carried to its own 
place, if unhindered, the one up the other down”.4 Similarly, the observation that it is 
 
4  Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, cap. 4, 208b (according to the standard system of references to 
Bekker’s 1831 edition of Aristotle’s works), trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton NJ, 
1984: Princeton University Press; repr. 1995), 1:315–446, at 1:355; and for discussion of 
Aristotle’s thinking on this point, see Edward Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the 
Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 58–60. A version of this idea is also found in Plato’s Timaeus, trans. 
Desmond Lee and Thomas Kjeller Johansen (London: Penguin, 2008): see e.g. 63d–e 
(according to the standard system of references to Stephanus’s 1578 edition of Plato’s works), 
trans. Lee and Johansen, 59: “the main aggregations of the basic kinds of matter occupy 
opposite regions to each other; and what is light or heavy or below or above in one region 
will be found to be or to become the direct opposite of, or to be at an angle to, or anyway 
different from, what has these characteristics in another region” (cf. also 56d–57c: trans. Lee 
and Johansen, 51–52). 
natural for heavy things to fall and light things to rise, or, as Chaucer puts it, “Lyght 
thinge upwarde, and dounwarde charge” (746), seems to be at least a distant 
recollection of Aristotle’s view that all bodies “have a natural tendency towards a 
certain position: and this is what it is to be light or heavy, the former being 
determined by an upward, the latter by a downward, tendency”.5 Meanwhile, the 
notion that sound is essentially broken air (“eyre y-broken”), so that the substance of 
sound is air itself (“in his substaunce ys but aire”: 768), clearly resembles Aristotle’s 
definition of sound specifically in terms of impact: “[air] must be struck with a 
 
5  Aristotle, Physics, Book VIII, cap. 4, 255b, trans. Hardie and Gaye, in Barnes, at 1:427. In 
Plato’s Timaeus, 52e–53a (trans. Lee and Johansen, 44), this tendency is explained in terms of a 
comparison with the process of winnowing (“the things that were moved were constantly 
being separated and carried in different directions, rather like the contents of a winnowing 
basket or a similar implement for cleaning corn, in which the solid and heavy stuff is sifted 
out and settles on one side, the light and insubstantial on another […] It separated the kinds 
most unlike each other furthest away from each other and pushed those most like each other 
towards the same place, with the result that they came to occupy different regions of space 
even before they were arranged into an ordered universe”). In Calcidius’s commentary, this 
winnowing is defined as the process by which “ea quae massa erunt secernuntur, grana 
quidem seorsum motu et agitatione, palaeae uero aliorsum ex iactatione; et leuia quidem 
uolitare, grauia uero residere” (Timaeus, a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, ed. J.H. 
Waszink, in Plato latinus 4 (London: Warburg Institute, 1962), 344). In his study of the 
possible influence of Calcidius on Chaucer, Joseph E. Grennen picks out this last phrase 
(“leuia quidem uolitare, grauia uero residere”), and suggests that it is a “very apt translation of 
line 746” of the House of Fame (“Chaucer and Chalcidius: The Platonic Origins of the House of 
Fame,” Viator 15 (1984): 237–62, at 247). However, unlike Calcidius, Chaucer’s application of 
this phrase is not specifically to the idea of winnowing. 
sudden sharp blow if it is to sound”.6 The Eagle’s emphasis on the way in which 
sound produces movements of air (“And of thys movynge, out of doute,/ Another 
ayre anoon ys meved”: 812–13) apparently corresponds with Aristotle’s assertion that 
“What has the power of producing sound is what has the power of setting in 
movement a single mass of air which is continuous up to the point of hearing”.7 And 
even the Eagle’s passing reference to the different kinds of sound produced by harps 
and pipes (771–79), and his comparison between them and human voices (780), have 
a precedent in Aristotle’s careful distinction between the real, animate voice of a 
living creature and the metaphorical “voice” of a musical instrument.8  
To a large extent, then, the authority to which the Eagle lays claim is clearly 
Aristotle’s, and it is theoretically possible that Chaucer did have some direct 
knowledge of the relevant parts of Aristotle’s corpus, via the commentaries of the 
twelfth-century Arabic philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Latin translations of 
which had been available in Europe since the first of half of the thirteenth century.9 
 
6  Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, cap. 8, 419b, trans. J.A. Smith, in Barnes, 1:641–92, at 1:668. 
What Aristotle seems to have particularly in mind is the sound created by the snapping of a 
whip. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 67, trans. Lee and Johansen, 63 (“Sound may be generally defined as 
a stroke given by air”). 
7  Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, cap. 8, 420a, trans. Smith, in Barnes 1:668. 
8  Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, cap. 8, 420b, trans. Smith, in Barnes 1:669: “it [is] only by a 
metaphor that we speak of the voice of the flute or the lyre of generally of what (being 
without soul) possesses the power of producing a succession of notes which differ in length 
and pitch and timbre.” 
9  For a text of the Latin version of Averroes’s “great” commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, see 
F. Stuart Crawford, ed., Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima 
 
However, it has long been something of a consensus among Chaucerian scholars that 
the principal sources for the Eagle’s acoustics are most likely to lie in the work of 
three eminent Latin authorities to whom Chaucer makes conspicuous reference 
elsewhere.10 These are: first, the fifth-century philosopher Macrobius, who appears as 
a distinct figure within The Parliament of Fowls (lines 120–170) and whose commentary 
on Cicero’s Dream of Scipio is mentioned on three other occasions in Chaucer’s 
works;11 second, the sixth-century philosopher Boethius, the author not just of the 
Consolation of Philosophy, but also, and more significantly in this context, a treatise on 
 
(Cambridge MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1953). On the influence of Averroes’s 
interpretations of Aristotle’s physics, see Ruth Glasner, Averroes’ Physics: A Turning Point in 
Medieval Natural Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). On the reception of 
Aristotle in the Latin West more generally, see Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” in The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982; repr. 1996) [henceforth CHLMP], 45–79; C.H. Lohr, ‘The 
Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle’, CHLMP, 80–98. A set of useful resources in relation to 
Averroes can be found at the Digital Averroes Research Environment (http://dare.uni-
koeln.de [accessed 23rd January, 2017]).  
10  See, for example, Minnis, Oxford Guides, 203. This consensus seems to have been established 
at least since Wilbur Owen Sypherd’s Studies in Chaucer’s Hous of Fame, Chaucer Society 2nd 
Series, Vol. 39 (London: Kegan Paul, 1904), where the three authors’ influence on the House of 
Fame is tabulated at 97–100.  
11  Macrobius, Commentarii in somnium Scipionis, ed. James A. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), trans. 
William Harris Stahl as Commentary on the Dream of Scipio by Macrobius (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1952; repr. 1990). Chaucer refers to Macrobius in The Book of the Duchess, line 
284; the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, VII.3123; The Romaunt of the Rose, Fragment A, line 7. 
music, to which Chaucer clearly alludes in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale (VII.3293–94);12 
and third, the thirteenth-century encyclopedist, Vincent of Beauvais, whom Chaucer 
names directly in the G-prologue to the Legend of Good Women (line 307).13 Nearly all 
of the “Aristotelian” motifs that I have listed can also be found in the work of these 
three men.14 Boethius and Vincent of Beauvais also provide analogues for the one 
 
12  Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed./trans. S.J. Tester, in Boethius: The Theological Tractates: 
The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand and S.J. Tester (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1918; repr. 1990); Boethius, De institutione musica, ed. Gottfried 
Friedlein, in Anicii Manlii Torquati Severini Boetii De institutione arithmetica libri duo, De institutione 
musica libri quinque… (Leipzig: Teubner, 1867), trans. C.M. Bower as Fundamentals of Music 
(New Haven NJ: Yale University Press, 1989). 
13  Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum quadruplex, vol. 1: Speculum naturale (Strasbourg: Rusch, ante 
1476). For a general set of resources in relation to Vincent, see A Vincent of Beauvais Website 
(http://www.vincentiusbelvacensis.eu/index.html [accessed: 23rd January, 2017]. 
14  For example, Aristotle’s view that “each [element] is carried to its own place, if unhindered, 
the one up the other down” is reflected by Macrobius, Commentary, Book 1, cap. 22, trans. 
Stahl, 181–182; and Boethius, Consolation, Book III, prose 11, ed./trans. Tester, 290–93. 
However, this idea was so widely known in the Middle Ages as to be something of a 
commonplace: it also appears for example, in St. Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the 
Pagans, Book 11, cap. 28, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1984), 463; Bernard 
Silvestris, Cosmographia, trans. Winthrop Wetherbee (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1973; repr. 1990), 72; and William of Conches, Dragmaticon Philosophie, Book 2, cap. 6, trans. 
Italo Ronca and Matthew Curr as A Dialogue on Natural Philosophy (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1997), 33–34. Sound is defined in terms of impact or percussion in 
Macrobius, Book II, cap. 1, trans. Stahl, 185–86; Boethius, De institutione, Book I, cap. 3, ed. 
Friedlein, 189 (“Idcirco definitur sonus percussio aëris indissoluta usque ad auditum”), trans. 
 
distinctive feature of the Eagle’s speech for which no clear precedent or inspiration is 
readily available in Aristotle, and which effectively provides the centre-piece of the 
Eagle’s whole argument: that is, the proof “by experience” (788) of throwing a stone 
 
Bower, 11 (“Sound is defined as a percussion of air remaining undissolved all the way to the 
hearing”); and Vincent, Speculum, Book 5, cap. 14 (“Sonus est aeris percussio indissoluta usque 
ad auditum”). Again parallels for this idea seem to have been widely disseminated, particularly 
in the context of medieval grammar (see Martin Irvine, “Medieval Grammatical Theory and 
Chaucer’s House of Fame,” Speculum 60 (1985): 850–76): for example, Donatus’s definition of 
voice as “aer ictus sensibilis auditu” (Irvine, 854). Cf. also the allegorical description of the 
senses by Chaucer’s near-contemporary Heinrich von Mügeln, who describes Hearing as one 
of the horses pulling the chariot of Reason: “sin futer was der lüfte slak,/ das pfert nicht 
ander weide pflak” (“Its food was the striking of the air. The horse did not graze in any other 
way”), ed./trans. Annette Volfing, Heinrich von Mügeln: ‘Der meide kranz’: A Commentary 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997), lines 1141–42, at 211. In relation to the “movynge [of] ayre”, cf. 
Boethius, De institutione, Book I, cap. 3, ed. Friedlein, 189 (“pulsus vero atque percussio nullo 
modo esse potest, nisi praecesserit motus”), trans. Bower, 11 (“pulsation and percussion 
cannot exist by any means unless motion precedes them”); Vincent, Speculum, Book 5, cap. 14 
(“Sonatum autem est motivum aeris”). For the distinction between wind and stringed 
instruments, see Boethius, De institutione, I. 2, ed. Friedlein, 189, trans. Bower, 10; and 
Macrobius, Book II, cap. 4, trans. Stahl, 197–98. See also J.A.W. Bennett’s discussion of the 
sources of the Eagle’s speech in Chaucer’s Book of Fame: an Exposition of ‘The House of Fame’ 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), pp. 76–80: he foregrounds Dante and Macrobius, and also 
suggests parallels with Vitruvius and Adelard of Bath, among others. More recently, Rebecca 
Davis’s discussion of the Eagle’s sources focuses on Dante and Boethius (“Fugitive Poetics in 
Chaucer’s House of Fame,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 37 (2015): 106–111. 
into a body of water and watching the ripples spread.15 Either one of these writers 
could be Chaucer’s immediate source for this conceit: the parallels are, in each case, 
 
15  Boethius, De institutione, Book 1, cap. 14, ed. Friedlein, 200: “Tale enim quiddam fieri 
consuevit in vocibus, quale cum in paludibus vel quietis aquis iactum eminus mergitur saxum. 
Prius enim in parvissimum orbem undam colligit, deinde maioribus orbibus undarum globos 
spargit, atque eo usque dum defatigus motus ab eliciendis fluctibus conquiescat. Semperque 
posterior et maior undula pulsu debiliore diffunditur. Quod si quid sit, quod crescentes undas 
possit offendere, statim motus ille revertitur et quasi ad centrum, unde profectus fuerat, 
eisdem undulis rotundatur. Ita igitur cum aër pulsus fecerit sonum, pellit alium proximum et 
quodammodo rotundum fluctum aeris ciet, itaque diffunditur et omnium circum stantium 
simul ferit auditum” (trans. Bower, 21: “The same thing happens in sounds that happens 
when a stone, thrown from above, falls into a puddle or into quiet water. First it causes a 
wave in a very small circle; then it disperses clusters of waves into larger circles, and so on 
until the motion, exhausted by the spreading out of waves, dies away. The latter, wider wave 
is always diffused by a weaker impulse. Now if something should impede the spreading 
waves, the same motion rebounds immediately, and it makes new circles by the same 
undulations as at the center whence it originated. In the same way, then, when air that is 
struck creates sound, it affects other air nearby and in this way sets in motion a circular wave 
of air; and so it is diffused and reaches the hearing of all standing around at the same time”); 
Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum, Book 5, cap. 17: “sonus efficitur secundum circulum maiorem 
et minorem; itaque minor circulus generat maiorem: et ille iterum maiorem. Cuius exemplum 
patet in lapillo in aqua proiecto in aquam, videlicet stantem. Ubi videlicet lapis cadens est 
centorum multorum circulorum successive generatorum [read: generator], eo quod una pars 
aque impulsata inundat super aliam circumquaque per circumferentiam.” Cf. also Vincent, 
Speculum, Book 26, cap. 58: “Ad quod demonstrandum [i.e. how sounds are made] inducit 
idem Boecius tale exemplum: lapis proiectus in medio stagni facit breuissimum circulum, et 
 
very strong, and there is no doubt that Chaucer might have known either or both of 
them directly. So it looks like the case is already closed: the scientific tradition to 
which the Eagle lays claims is largely Aristotelian, and Chaucer could easily have 
sourced his Aristotelianism from the three venerable and widely cited authorities 
whose work he claims himself to have known: that is, Macrobius, Boethius and 
Vincent of Beauvais. 
 
II. THE ‘CUTTING-EDGE’ EAGLE? 
The one thing that is troubling about this analysis is that it makes the Eagle’s 
scientific horizons (and by extension, Chaucer’s) seem so very old-fashioned. The 
 
ille alium, et hoc fit donec vel ad ripas pervenerit, vel impetus defecerit.” In Calcidius’s 
commentary on the Timaeus, this image is used to describe not sound, but the nature of 
primary matter: “Sed ut in stagnis, cum immobilis est aquae superficies, incidente aliqua 
grauiore mole primo nascitur initium motus, deinde agitatione facta totius elementi non solum 
agmen aquae mouetur, sed illud ipsum, quod incidit causamque motus praebuit, uicissim 
mouet, sic silua quoque ex initio corporum sumpto motu non solum ipsa omnifariam 
mouetur, uerum ipsa corpora, quae initium motus sunt, inuicem pellit” (ed. Waszink, 343; see 
also Grennen, “Chaucer and Chalcidius,” 255–56). The same analogy is also used by Averroes 
(Commentarium Magnum, 419b, ed. Crawford, 248: “Et debes scire quod sonus non fit in aere 
ita quod aer qui expellitur a percutiente movetur per se singulariter donec perveniat ad 
auditum, sed debes scire quod illud quod fit in aere de percussione corporum adinvicem est 
simile ei quod fit in aqua, quando lapis proiicitur in aquam, scilicet quia fit in aere apud 
percussionem figura sperica, aut prope spericam, cuius centrum est locus percussionis per 
expulsionem aeris ab illo loco equaliter, aut prope.” (Both of the references to the Speculum 
naturale in the Riverside Chaucer – “4.18 and 25.58” – are erroneous.) 
implication is that Chaucer had no acquaintanceship with the remarkable scientific 
developments that had taken place in England since the middle of the thirteenth 
century, very often as a direct response to Aristotle’s physics. This was a period that 
saw England (and Oxford in particular) develop a remarkable reputation for highly 
rigorous, innovative and precise thinking about the workings of the universe. The 
possibility that Chaucer’s thinking about the physics of sound might actually be more 
up-to-date than it might at first seem has been advocated most energetically by 
Joseph E. Grennen. 16 He defines the Eagle’s speech as “a pastiche of terms and 
ideas drawn from contemporary scientific writing”; and he suggests, among other 
things, that the Eagle’s speech reflects the particular influence of Robert Grosseteste 
and Walter Burley. These claims are perhaps worth exploring more fully, in part 
because they imply that Chaucer’s engagement with scientific thought was much 
deeper and more active than is usually assumed, and in part because they rely on 
correspondences of terminology and argument that are not easy to assess or 
interpret. 
Grosseteste was not exactly a “contemporary” of Chaucer (he died in 1253), but 
he was a highly original thinker, in many ways at the cutting edge of scientific 
thinking in the thirteenth century, and he has at least a good claim to being the 
founding father of the English scientific tradition that I have just described. 17 
 
16  Joseph E. Grennen, “Science and Poetry in Chaucer’s House of Fame,” Annuale Mediaevale 8 
(1967): 38–45.  
17  On Grosseteste’s science, and his mind in general, see A.C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the 
Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953); R.W. Southern, Robert 
Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (1986; 2nd edn: Oxford: Clarendon, 
 
Grosseteste wrote a set of Notes on Aristotle’s Physics, which seem to have been 
widely cited in Oxford well into the fourteenth century,18 as well as a whole series of 
short, and in some cases brilliantly innovative, works on specific questions in physics, 
including one on the generation of sounds.19 As lector to the Franciscans in Oxford 
and then Bishop of Lincoln, Grosseteste exerted a powerful influence on the 
intellectual development of the university. A.C. Crombie even claims that 
“Grosseteste’s theory of science determined the approach of the next generations of 
Oxford natural philosophers to the physical world” and that “their work was in many 
ways simply an elaboration in concrete detail of his general principles of investigation 
and explanation.”20 This formulation possibly overstates the case, but there is no 
question that Grosseteste is a very important figure in the history of English 
 
1992); James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Maura 
O’Carroll, ed., Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition (Rome: Istituto 
Storico dei Cappuccini, 2003); Evelyn A. Mackie and Joseph Goering, eds, Editing Robert 
Grosseteste (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).  
18  Richard C. Dales, ed., Roberti Grosseteste Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis 
(Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1963). See also Neil Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste’s 
Notes on Physics,” in Editing Robert Grosseteste, ed. Mackie and Goering, 103–34. 
19  Ludwig Baur, ed., Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln († 1253) (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1917); Cecilia Panti, ed., Moti, virtù e motori celesti nella cosmologia di Roberto 
Grossatesta: Studio ed edizione dei trattati De sphera, De cometis, De motu supercelestium (Florence: 
SISMEL/Galluzzo, 2001). De generatione sonorum, ed. Baur, 7–10 (available online at the 
Electronic Grosseteste, http://www.grosseteste.com [accessed: 17th May 2016]). 
20  Crombie, Robert Grosseteste, 135. 
science, and certainly important enough for Grennen’s suggestion of a connection 
between Grosseteste and Chaucer to invite further scrutiny.  
As it turns out, Grennen’s evidence for Chaucer’s direct knowledge of 
Grosseteste’s writing is not very convincing. He argues that “the eagle’s definition of 
sound in terms as ‘noght but eyr ybroken’ [(765)] is probably Chaucer’s deliberately 
garbled version of a current explanation not of sound simpliciter but of the echo – a 
reversal of sound caused by a fractio radii at the obstacle with which it collides, on the 
analogy with the reflection of light”.21 This seems like an unnecessarily complex 
explanation of what the Eagle actually says, given that the idea of sound as “broken 
air” was relatively commonplace in the Middle Ages, and readily available to Chaucer 
in the work of Boethius, Macrobius and Vincent of Beauvais (and probably 
elsewhere as well). Grennen also suggests that The House of Fame’s reference to the air 
being “twyst with violence” (775) should be compared with a specific sentence from 
Grosseteste’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, in which “the substance 
of sound” is defined as “light incorporated into the very finest air, [so that] when a 
sounding object is violently struck, parts of it are necessarily scattered from the 
natural position that they occupy throughout the sounding body”.22 Grosseteste’s 
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics seems to have become a relatively well known 
text in medieval universities, but there is no particular reason for thinking that 
 
21  Grennen, “Science and Poetry,” 42. 
22  Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, II. 4: “Substantia autem 
soni est lux incorporata in subtilissimo aere, et cum percutitur sonativum violenter necesse est 
partes eius disgredi a situ suo naturali quem habent in toto sonativo” (cited from Crombie, 
Robert Grosseteste, 115, n. 1). 
Chaucer would have made direct use of it himself; and the sentence to which 
Grennen points actually has little in common with the House of Fame except for its 
shared heritage in Aristotle. That both the Eagle and Grosseteste refer to “violence” 
in the context of sound is not very telling in itself, since the violence in question is 
specifically that of impact, and the emphasis on impact goes back to Aristotle (the 
“sudden sharp blow” from which sound is created). There is certainly no parallel in 
the Eagle’s speech for what is the most distinctive aspect of Grosseteste’s acoustics: 
the suggestion that the substance of sound is ultimately light – “light incorporated 
into the very finest air”. 23  There are several problems, finally, with Grennen’s 
insistence that the Eagle’s reference to both a “demonstracion/ In myn 
ymagynacion” (727–28) and a proof “by experience” (787–88) reflects “the 
fourteenth-century physicist’s distinction between problems conceived secundum 
imaginationem (‘thought experiments’) and those worked out per experimentiam”. This he 
suggests (following Crombie) was Grosseteste’s peculiar “contribution” to the 
history of European science.24 Here he makes too casual a conflation between the 
language of fourteenth-century scientific writing and the particular terms of 
Grosseteste’s own thinking, as if it would have been impossible to draw any 
distinction between imagination and experience in the fourteenth century without 
specific deference to what Crombie sees as Grosseteste’s uniting of “the two twelfth-
 
23  The Eagle argues at one point that sound is in “aire y-broke” in the same way as flames are 
“lyghted smoke” (769–770), but this is an analogy designed to explain only how sound is 
incorporated in air (just as flame is a kind of special form of smoke), not a suggestion to the 
effect that light provides any part of sound’s substance. 
24  Grennen, “Science and Poetry,” 42. 
century traditions of technology and logic”. Grennen also insists too narrowly on the 
connection between these two moments in the Eagle’s speech – that is, the 
“demonstracion/ In myn ymagynacion” and the proof “by experience” – as if they 
were necessarily to be read as opposing terms in a single contrast, even though they 
are actually separated by some sixty lines. 
Grennen goes on to argue that “the most convincing proof […] of Chaucer’s 
familiarity with current speculation [in scientific thought]” is his apparent familiarity 
with Walter Burley’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.25 Again, this would be a very 
significant connection – if it could be proved. Like Grosseteste, Burley is a very 
significant figure in the history of natural philosophy. He was a regular antagonist of 
William Ockham (who, like Burley, wrote on Aristotle’s Physics);26 and among the 
various issues on which Burley and Ockham disagreed was the way in which the 
 
25  In fact, Burley seems to have engaged so continuously with Aristotle’s Physics as to have 
produced several distinct versions of his commentary: see Rega Wood, “Walter Burley’s 
Physics Commentaries,” Franciscan Studies 44 (1984): 275–327. On Burley’s career more 
generally, see Edith D. Sylla, The Oxford Calculators and the Mathematics of Motion 1320–1350: 
Physics and Measurements of Latitudes (New York, 1991; originally a Harvard doctoral 
dissertation, 1970), 70–111; Jennifer Ottman and Wood, “Walter Burley: His Life and 
Works”, Vivarium 37 (1999): 1–23; M.C. Sommers, “Burley, Walter (b. 1274/5, d. in or after 
1344),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [henceforth ODNB], article 4037. 
26  On Ockham generally, see Paul Vincent Spade, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ockham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and on Ockham’s physics, in particular, 
André Goddu, “Ockham’s Philosophy of Nature,” Cambridge Companion, 143–67. 
quantity of motion inheres in any moving body.27 It is perhaps worth emphasizing 
that Burley, like many thirteenth- and fourteenth-century English physicists, tended 
to subordinate questions on natural science to both theology and formal logic, in 
such a way as to make much of the “scientific thinking” in this period a dizzying 
mixture of the vastly philosophical and the narrowly terminological. 28  However, 
Burley’s interest in physical questions, and in questions of motion in particular, is 
pronounced enough to mean that he is also sometimes seen as precursor to that 
group of extraordinarily brilliant English thinkers now known interchangeably as the 
Mertonians or the Oxford Calculators, whose particular contribution was the 
introduction, to this already heady mix of methodologies, of a large dose of 
mathematics. Burley is sometimes classed as a full member of this group, as he is, for 
example, by Edith Sylla, the author of what is still the most thorough and accessible 
study of the Calculators and their work, 29  even though much of Burley’s own 
 
27  J.A. Weisheipl, “The Interpretation of Aristotle’s Physics and the Science of Motion,” in 
CHLMP, 521–36, esp. 530–32; see also Edith Dudley Sylla, “Walter Burley’s Physics 
Commentaries and the Mathematics of Alteration,” Early Science and Medicine 6 (2001): 149–
184; Dirk-Jan Dekker, “Time and Motion in Walter Burley’s Late Expositio on Aristotle’s 
Physics,” Early Science and Medicine 6 (2001): 185–203. 
28  For a concise and suggestive analysis of fourteenth-century intellectual culture generally, see 
John E. Murdoch, “The Development of a Critical Temper: New Approaches and Modes of 
Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy, Science and Theology,” in Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies: Proceedings of the Southeastern Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies: Summer 1975, ed. 
Siegfried Wenzel (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 51–79. 
29  Sylla, Oxford Calculators (cited above, n. 25). See also Marshall Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in 
the Middle Ages (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Curtis Wilson, William 
 
philosophical activity in this field predates what is probably the defining text in this 
intellectual movement, Thomas Bradwardine’s treatise of 1328, De proportionibus 
velocitatum in motibus.30 In this treatise, Bradwardine set out to remedy one of the most 
 
Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics (Madison WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1956); J.A. Weisheipl, “The Place of John Dumbleton in the Merton 
School,” Isis 50 (1959): 439–54; J.A. Weisheipl, “Ockham and Some Mertonians,” Mediæval 
Studies 30 (1968): 163-213; J.A. Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonense,” Mediæval Studies 31 
(1969): 174–224; E.D. Sylla, The Oxford Calculators and the Mathematics of Motion, 1320–1350: 
Physics and the Measurement by Latitudes (doctoral dissertation, Harvard, 1970; repr. New York, 
1991); Crombie, 1:86–93 and 2:57–110; North, 16–17; E.D. Sylla, “The Oxford Calculators,” 
CHLMP, 540–63; William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. the section on “The New Physics,” 
240–49; David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992; repr. 2007), 300–306; Keith Snedegar, “Merton Calculators (act. c.1300–
c.1349),” ODNB, theme 95034. 
30  H. Lamar Crosby, Thomas of Bradwardine: his Tractatus de proportionibus: its significance for the 
development of mathematical physics (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955); 
Weisheipl, “The Interpretation of Aristotle’s Physics” (cited above n. 27), esp. 533–36; John 
E. Murdoch, “Thomas Bradwardine: Mathematics and Continuity in the Fourteenth century,” 
in Mathematics and its Applications to Science and Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages: Essays in 
Honor of Marshall Clagett, ed. Edward Grant and John E. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 103–37. For Bradwardine’s logic, see Thomas Bradwardine: Insolubilia, 
ed. Stephen Read (Paris: Peeters, 2010). For his life, see Gordon Leff, “Bradwardine, Thomas 
(c.1300–1349),” ODNB, article 3213. Weisheipl sees Bradwardine as the “founder of the 
Merton School” (“Ockham and Some Mertonians,” 189).   
obvious defects in Aristotle’s Physics, the lack of mathematical explanation of the 
principles governing acceleration and velocity, and it was this work (rather than 
Grosseteste’s suite of short, speculative treatises on particular questions in physics) 
that seems to have set the dominant agenda for what was to develop into an 
extensive and distinctly Oxford-based tradition of work on the inter-relationship 
between logic, physics and mathematics, with a particular focus on problems in 
mechanics (i.e. on problems relating to forces and motions). This tradition includes 
work by such figures as William Heytesbury, John Dumbleton, Richard Kilvington, 
Richard Swineshead and Roger Swineshead. Their achievements have been described 
as “a revolution in scientific thought”,31 not just because of their treatment of the 
particular mechanical problems they chose to solve, but also because of the 
precedent they set for the use of mathematics in natural science. 32  In popular 
histories of science,33 the Oxford Calculators are now sometimes given particular 
 
31  Weisheipl, “The Place of John Dumbleton,” 439. 
32  Lindberg rightly comments that while “today the application of mathematics to motion needs 
no defense […] it is only by hindsight and from a modern perspective that this conclusion is 
obvious; it would not have seemed plausible to many who worked within the Aristotelian 
tradition” (Beginnings, 299). 
33  See, e.g., James Hannam, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of 
Modern Science (London: Icon, 2009), 175 (“they [the Mertonians] almost certainly beat out the 
path later followed by Galileo and the other founders of modern science”) and 178–180 
(where the mean speed theorem is described as “the most significant result of fourteenth-
century physics”). However, as Lindberg observes, “medieval physics was not a primitive 
version of modern physics and cannot be legitimately judged by comparison with it modern 
namesake” (Beginnings, 286) 
credit for having anticipated Galileo in the formulation of the mean speed theorem 
(which describes the distance covered in a specified time by a uniformly accelerated 
or decelerated body);34 but perhaps what is most striking is that, for them, the mean 
speed theorem was, as Sylla puts it, merely “a fairly routine lemma”:35 that is, only a 
relatively basic premise preliminary to addressing problems that were in themselves 
much more complex. The existence of this tradition in Oxford certainly 
demonstrates that scientific thinking in the fourteenth century extended well beyond 
the astrology, alchemy and magic that student-guides to Chaucer tend to represent as 
the sum-total of medieval science,36 but also quite a long way beyond the relatively 
 
34  In Heytesbury’s formulation: “For whether it [i.e. latitude or increment of velocity] 
commences from zero degree or from some [finite] degree, every latitude, as long as it is 
terminated at some finite degree, and as long as it acquired or lost uniformly, will correspond 
to its mean degree of velocity. Thus the moving body, acquiring or losing this latitude 
uniformly during some assigned period of time, will traverse a distance exactly equal to what 
it would traverse in an equal period of time if it were moved uniformly at its mean degree [of 
velocity]” (Heytesbury, Reguli solvendi sophismata (Venice: Locatellus, 1494), trans. Clagett, 
Science of Mechanics, 270). See also Edward Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages (New York: 
Wiley, 1971), 55–59; Grant, Foundations of Modern Science, 100–104. 
35  Sylla, Oxford Calculators, 174: “Aside from the fact that Swineshead gives four different proofs 
of the mean speed theorem, it would appear to be a fairly routine lemma. He does not give it 
any special importance, and does not even give it the honor of labelling it as a separate 
conclusion.” 
36  See e.g. Mahmoud Manzalaoui, “Chaucer and Science,” in Geoffrey Chaucer: The Writer and his 
Background, ed. Derek Brewer (Cambridge: Brewer, 1974; repr. 1990), 224–61; Irma 
Taavitsainen, “Science,” in A Companion to Chaucer, ed. Peter Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000; 
 
simple models and basic observations about the structure of things that characterize 
the Eagle’s speech in the House of Fame.  
It certainly seems hard to believe that Chaucer knew absolutely nothing at all 
about the Calculators’ work in physics, not even by reputation. After all, Thomas 
Bradwardine (the author of De proportionibus) is mentioned very prominently in the 
Nun’s Priest’s Tale (VII.3242); and it may well be that the Nun’s Priest’s Tale refers 
to him a second time (this time more codedly) in the plea for a benediction with 
which this Tale concludes.37 At the end of Troilus and Criseyde Chaucer submits the 
poem to the scrutiny of his learned friend, Ralph Strode, who is probably to be 
identified with the logician who was a fellow of Merton College, like so many of the 
Calculators earlier in the century (including Walter Burley).38 However, there is no 
indication that Strode himself had any particular interest in the kind of mechanical 
problems so characteristic of his predecessors at Merton; and the Nun’s Priest 
 
repr. 2002), 378–96; J.A. Tasioulas, “Science,” in Chaucer: An Oxford Guide, ed. Steve Ellis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 174–89. Not one of these accounts of Chaucer’s 
scientific horizons even mentions fourteenth-century English physics. 
37  See David P. Baker, “A Bradwardinian Benediction: The Ending of the Nun’s Priest’s Tale 
Revisited,” Medium Ævum 82 (2013): 236–43; David P. Baker, “Literature, Logic and 
Mathematics in the Fourteenth Century,” unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of 
Durham, 2013), 104–107. 
38  See Rodney Delasanta, “Chaucer and Strode,” Chaucer Review 26 (1991): 205–18; J.D. North, 
“Strode, Ralph (d. 1387),” ODNB, article 26673. On Strode’s logic, see Wallace Knight 
Seaton, “An Edition and Translation of the ‘Tractatus de Consequentiis’ by Ralph Strode, 
Fourteenth-Century Logician and Friend of Geoffrey Chaucer,” unpublished doctoral 
dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1973). 
invokes Bradwardine, not as the author of De proportionibus, but only as the author of 
the monumental philosophical treatise, De causa Dei: 39  in other words, as a 
controversial theologian, rather than as a pioneer in the mathematization of physics. 
If it could be proved that Chaucer was directly acquainted with Burley’s work on 
Aristotle’s Physics, then it would be hard to deny that Chaucer would have been 
capable of appreciating this whole tradition of advanced scientific speculation. 
Once again, however, Grennen’s evidence for Chaucer’s “Chaucer’s familiarity 
with current speculation [in scientific thought]” turns out to be disappointingly thin; 
and the case he makes for Chaucer’s knowledge of Burley’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics, is not, in itself, at all convincing. What Grennen argues, 
specifically, is that Chaucer’s use of the word “conservatyf” (847) in the course of 
saying that the House of Fame is the place in the universe that best “conserves” 
sound was directly conditioned by Burley’s use of the expression “virtutem 
conseruatiuam locati existentis” in the course of explicating Averroes’s reading of 
Aristotle’s fourth book of Physics. This phrase Grennen translates as “a power for 
conserving the placed thing”. However, the passage in Burley’s commentary from 
which Grennen cites this phrase is not nearly so relevant to the Eagle’s concept of 
“kyndely place” (842) as Grennen suggests it is, since what it is specifically at issue 
for Burley is how the “natural place” of each elements ought to be defined in relation 
 
39  Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum (London: John Bill, 
1618). There is no modern edition of this work: however, edited extracts with translations 
into modern German have recently been published by Edit Anna Lukács, in Thomas 
Bradwardine: De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum: Auszüge Lateinisch-Deutsch 
(Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2013). 
to the other elements, particularly in the light of Aristotle’s proposition that “the 
place of a thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it”.40 Burley 
is principally concerned here with Averroes’s rejection of what might look like an 
obvious deduction from Aristotle’s proposition: i.e. that if “the place of a thing is the 
innermost motionless boundary of what contains it”, then the “natural place” of 
earth is therefore the “innermost motionless boundary” of the element which is 
naturally adjacent to it. But this deduction would be obviously wrong in a number of 
ways, as Averroes and Burley emphasize:   
Certum est quod terra non moueretur ad superficiem aque ibi existentem, et 
propter hoc superficies aque non est locus naturalis per se ipsius terre, et hec 
est intentio Commentatoris commento .24. [recte .42.] huius capituli, ubi dicit 
quod “graue querit hunc finem [nisi] secundum quod est medium totius, et 
non secundum quod est finis aque. Et si non esset ita, tunc terra moveretur 
ad aquam ubicunque fuerit finis eius, sicut ferrum mouetur ad magnetem 
ubicunque fuerit. Sed hoc non sentit[ur] de aqua”41 – hec Commentator. 
Dico igitur quod ultimum aque non est per se locus naturalis terre, nec eadem 
ratione est ultimum aeris locus naturalis aque.  
Certainly, earth is not attracted only so far as the surface of any water 
happening to be there, and therefore the surface of the water is not the 
“natural place” of earth in and of itself: this what the Commentator means to 
 
40  Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, cap. 4, 212b20, trans. Hardie and Gaye, in Barnes, at 1:361. 
41  Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 42 (Venice: Andreas Torresanus, 1483), fol. 
54ra; (Venice: Lucas Antonius Iuncta, 1562), fol. 140va–vb. 
say in his 24th [recte 42nd] comment on this chapter, where he says that “a 
heavy thing seeks this boundary [between earth and water], not just to the 
extent that it seeks to reach the boundary of the water, but rather to the 
extent that it seeks to reach the middle of the whole. And if this were not the 
case, then earth would always be attracted to [the surface of] the water 
wherever it happened to be, just as iron is attracted to a magnet where it 
happens to be, but this is found not to be the case with water” – such [are 
the words of] the Commentator. I say, therefore, that the surface of water is 
not in itself the “natural place” of earth, nor by the same reason is the 
boundary with air the “natural place” of water.42 
In effect, what Averroes and Burley argue is that, even if earth is always attracted 
downwards such that it always passes through water until it reaches at least the 
boundary between earth and water, this does not mean that it is solely and 
particularly to this boundary that earth is attracted.  
It is only in the course of trying to explicate this very technical point that Burley 
introduces what is, in effect, a distinction between two different ways of conceiving 
of the elements’ attraction to their “natural place”. It is not just that each element is 
drawn away from the other elements in such a way that it is always trying to reach at 
least the limits of the space occupied by any of the others. His point is that it is also 
drawn to its own proper sphere, in such a way that this elemental attraction always 
 
42  Walter Burley, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Venice: Johannes Herbort, 1482), fol. 117v; 
(Venice: Simon de Luere, 1501; facsimile repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1972), fol. 106ra. 
operates, regardless of the nature of each element’s boundaries with the other 
elements: 
Et si queratur quis igitur est locus naturalis terre per se, loquendo de loco 
locante et circumscribente, dico quod locus naturalis per se ipsius terre est 
ultimum aque secundum quod aqua est in tali situ, et in tali distantia ad 
orbem. Locus enim naturalis plus dic[o] 43  quam ultimum corporis 
continentis, quia ultra ultimum corporis continentis, addit virtutem 
conseruatiuam locati existentis in corpore locante; et ideo si aer esset in loco 
totius aque, ultimum aeris esset locus naturalis terre, quia aer existens in tali 
situ, haberet virtutem conseruandi terram. 
And if it were asked what therefore is the “natural place” of earth in itself, I 
would say that the “natural place” in which earth is located and 
circumscribed, in and of itself, is the boundary with water [only] to the extent 
that water is in that particular position and at some distance from the sphere 
[of earth itself]. I refer to “natural place”44 rather than the boundary of a 
containing body [i.e. to the nature of attractive forces, rather than to 
Aristotle’s conceptualisation of extension in space], since beyond the 
boundary of the containing body, this additionally confers the conserving 
power of an existing location (virtutem conseruatiuam locati existentis). This means 
that, if the place of the water were wholly taken by air, the “natural place” of 
 
43  dico] dicit (in both the 1482 and 1501 editions) 
44  Grennen translates: “non-natural place”. He seems to have mis-expanded the abbreviation for 
“enim”, wrongly reading “non”. 
earth would then be the boundary of air, since air existing in that particular 
place would have the power to keep earth in position. 
It looks as if Burley might have been particularly indebted here to St Thomas 
Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics:  
Videmus enim quod unumquodque horum fertur in suum proprium locum 
quando non impeditur, grave quidem deorsum, leve autem sursum. Ex quo 
patet quod locus habet quandam virtutem conservandi locatum: et propter 
hoc locatum tendit in suum locum desiderio suae conservationis. Non autem 
ex hoc ostenditur quod locus habeat virtutem attractivam, nisi sicut finis 
dicitur attrahere.  
For we observe that each of these bodies is carried to its proper place when it 
is not prevented, i.e., the heavy are carried down and the light upward. This 
shows that place has a certain power of conserving what is in place. For this 
reason, an object tends to its own place by the desire to conserve itself. This, 
however, does not prove that place has the power to attract, except in the 
sense in which the end is said to attract.45 
Aquinas’s virtus conservandi locatum (“power of conserving what is placed”) is simpler 
and more immediately comprehensible than Burley’s virtus conservativa locati existentis 
(“conserving power of an existing location”), and it may well be that Burley’s 
phrasing here should be interpreted merely as a version of Aquinas’s formulation. 
 
45  St Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Book IV, Lectio 1, 412, ed./trans. 
Pierre H. Conway (College of St Mary of the Springs: Columbus OH, 1958–62), online at: 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics.htm) [accessed: 17th May, 2016]. 
Whether or not this is the case, it is clearly part of a relatively involved philosophical 
discussion, and the point it is designed to make is very specific to this discussion. It is 
difficult to see how Chaucer’s Eagle’s suggestion that the House of Fame naturally 
conserves sound must necessarily reflect any of these complexities. There is simply 
no reason to think that this particular phrase would have captured Chaucer’s 
attention, even if he had been reading Burley attentively and with profit. 
 
III. RIPPLES ON THE WATER 
So far, then, my argument has been rather negative and inconclusive: I have simply 
observed that thirteenth- and fourteenth-century English physics seems to be 
conspicuous only by its absence from the Eagle’s account of the mechanics of sound; 
and I have contested Grennen’s suggestion that English physics is nevertheless 
visible in the Eagle’s speech in the form of identifiable references to Grosseteste and 
Burley. However, I do not think that we are obliged to choose between assuming 
either that Chaucer’s knowledge of physics was wholly old-fashioned – to the extent 
that he had no awareness of any writer on the subject more recent than Vincent of 
Beauvais – or that he must have had a direct and detailed acquaintance with the work 
of highly sophisticated thinkers like Grosseteste and Burley. I will argue that 
Chaucer’s approach to the themes of the Eagle’s speech is decisively shaped by 
another writer who can be shown to have links with Grosseteste, Burley and the 
Oxford Calculators – but who is hardly an innovative thinker on physics himself. I 
will also suggest that not only did this fourteenth-century writer provide Chaucer 
with several themes and metaphors of a broadly “scientific” kind: he also showed 
him how perspectives on physics could be used to effect even in contexts that are 
otherwise predominantly moral or allegorical. The writer I have in mind is Robert 
Holcot, the Dominican friar best known for his widely circulated Commentary on 
the deutero-canonical book of Wisdom. 46  The strongest evidence for Holcot’s 
influence on the Eagle’s speech derives, perhaps surprisingly, from the one passage 
in The House of Fame that might seem least in need of any new suggestions about the 
nature of its sources: that is, the Eagle’s description of the ripples produced when a 
stone is thrown into a body of water. As I have already pointed out, analogues for 
this passage can be found in both Boethius and Vincent of Beauvais. However, there 
is also a direct parallel for it in Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary, a parallel which seems 
 
46  There is no modern edition of the Wisdom-commentary. I have used the Hagenau 1494 
edition (repr. in facsimile: Frankfurt-a-M: Minerva, 1974) [henceforth H]; the Venice 1509 
edition [V] (available online via the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: http://reader.digitale-
sammlungen.de/resolve/display/bsb10148926.html  [accessed: 23rd January, 2017]; and the 
the MS copy of the Wisdom-commentary in Oxford, Balliol College, MS 27 [O] (using the 
photographs available at 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/balliolarchivist/sets/72157641118102464/ [accessed: 23rd 
January, 2017]. For a list of manuscripts and early printed editions of this work, see Friedrich 
Stegmüller, Repertorium biblicum medii Aevi, 11 vols (Madrid: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 1950–80), 5: 143–47, no. 7416. On Holcot generally, see Beryl 
Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960); 
and, more recently, Jenny Swanson, “Holcot, Robert (c.1290–1349),” in ODNB, article 13485. 
On his theological Quodlibeta, see Richard E. Gillespie, “Robert Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” Traditio 
27 (1971) 480–90; and Hester Goodenough Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason: Three 
Questions on the Nature of God, by Robert Holcot, OP (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1983). 
to have been noticed in Chaucerian scholarship only relatively recently.47 Holcot’s 
use of the ripples-on-the-water analogy in Lection 193 of this commentary is, in fact, 
remarkably close in phrasing to Chaucer’s, much closer even than seems to have 
been realized, and in several respects noticeably closer to what the Eagle says than 
the corresponding passages in either Boethius or Vincent of Beauvais.  
In Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary Chaucer would have found a convenient 
summary, not just of Aristotle’s thinking on the physics of the sound, but also of the 
refinements on it offered by Aristotle’s great “Commentator”, Averroes: 
Naturale autem generationem ipsius Echo declarat Aristoteles .ii. De Anima, 
textu48 correspondente commento .viii. Est enim secundum Commentatorem 
“iteratio soni conseruando figuram suam”:49 et fit ab aere percusso et sonante 
cum reflexione ad aliquid obstaculum maxime concauum. Ponit autem ad 
hoc exemplum Aristoteles de lumine: Lumen multiplicatum in aere et 
reflexum ad aliquod politum 50  reflectitur versus illam partem in qua 
generatur, sicut manifestum est in corpore luminoso quod illuminatur, non 
solum per radios incidentes, sed per radios reflexos; aliter51 esset vmbra52 
 
47  John M. Fyler, Language and the Declining World in Chaucer, Dante and Jean de Meun (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 151, and 250, n. 173. Fyler’s observation is noted in 
Havely’s new edition, n. to lines 787–822, 184–85. 
48  textu] O; HV om. 
49  Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, 419b25–419b33, ed. Crawford, 251. 
50  Ponit autem ad hoc exemplum Aristoteles de lumine: Lumen multiplicatum in aere et 
reflexum ad aliquod politum] HV Ponit autem flexum ad aliquod corpus politum et tersum O 
51  aliter] HV; alias O 
vbicumque non incidunt radii solis. (Lection 193: V, fol. 164ra; O, fol. 
286rb)53 
Aristotle explains the natural origins of this “Echo” in the second book of On 
the Soul: [see also] the corresponding commentary, distinction 8 [recte 80], for 
according to the Commentator [i.e. Averroes] Echo is “the repetition of 
sound in such a way as to conserve its shape”, and it is made out of air which 
has been struck and which resounds when it is reflected towards any obstacle 
that is as concave as possible. Indeed, in relation to this Aristotle suggests an 
analogy with light. 54  Light that is multiplied in air and thrown onto any 
polished surface is reflected back towards the point at which it is generated, 
just as is evident in the case of a luminous body that is illuminated not only 
by rays [of light] striking directly, but also by rays that are reflected: otherwise 
there would be shadow wherever the rays of the sun do not strike. 
It is at this point in his discussion of the physics of sound that Holcot introduces the 
analogy with the ripples created on the surface of a body of water by a falling object: 
 
52  vmbra] HV tenebra O 
53  There are no page-numbers in H. 
54  Fyler seems to think that Holcot is misguidedly referring at this point to some Aristotelian 
work called “de Lumine” (Language, 250, n. 173), but this is not the case. Holcot’s reference is 
to Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, cap. 8, 419b, trans. Smith, in Barnes, 1:668: “What happens 
here must be analogous to what happens in the case of light: light is always reflected – 
otherwise it would not be diffused and outside what was directly illuminated by the sun there 
would be blank darkness.” 
Aliud exemplum est in aqua. Si enim lapillus proiicatur in aquam, fiunt multe 
circulationes vbi cecidit55 lapillus et minor circulus56 pellendo causat maiorem 
et ille57 alium, et sic deinceps58 donec deficiat virtus primi pellentis.59 Si autem 
circulationes ille occurrant alicui obstaculo priusquam virtus60 primi pellentis 
deficiat, repercutiuntur: 61  et fiunt circulationes versus locum vbi prima 
percussio facta est per lapidem. (Lection 193: V, fol. 164ra–b; O, fol. 286rb–
ra) 
Another example of this is in water: for if a pebble is thrown into water, this 
creates many circles where the pebble fell; and each smaller circle causes the 
[next] larger one by impelling it outwards, and this then causes the next 
[larger one], and so on successively, until the force of the initial impulsion is 
exhausted. If, however, these circles run into any obstacle before the force of 
the first impulsion is exhausted, they are bounced back, and the circles return 
towards the point where the initial impact was made by the stone. 
Averroes makes use of this same analogy in the chapter immediately before the one 
that Holcot cites;62 and it may well be that Holcot’s own use of this analogy was 
 
55  circulationes vbi cecidit] HV circulationes quarum centrum est locus vbi cadit O 
56  circulus] HV circulatio O 
57  ille] HV illa O 
58  deinceps] HV; O om. 
59  pellentis] HV; inpellentis O 
60  virtus] HV; O om. 
61  repercutiuntur] HV; et repercutiuntur O 
62  Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, 419b, ed. Crawford, 248 (cited above, n. 49). 
most directly prompted by Averroes, rather than Boethius or Vincent of Beauvais,63 
neither of whom he mentions at this point.  
In order to describe the effect of the stone falling the water Holcot repeatedly 
uses the terms “circulationes” and “circulus”, and The House of Fame could be taken 
to reflect this in its use of the word “sercle” at lines 791, 794 and 796. Vincent of 
Beauvais likewise makes repeated use of the word “circulus”, but only in relation to 
sound in general, not when describing the spread of ripples as such. Even more 
striking, however, is the fact that Holcot specifically says that each of these circular 
ripples causes (“causat”) the next one, since “cause” also seems to have been a key-
term in this context for Chaucer too. Neither Boethius, Vincent of Beavais nor 
Averroes refer specifically to “cause” in relation to the ripples created by a stone 
falling into water, whereas Chaucer’s Eagle uses the term three times in quick 
succession (at lines 794, 796 and 800). Holcot also seems to have provided Chaucer 
with another term that is very prominent in the Eagle’s speech: that is, 
“multiplication” (which appears at lines 784, 801, and 820).64 Again, there is no 
 
63  Boethius, De institutione, Book I, cap. 14, ed. Friedlein, 200, trans. Bower, 21, and Vincent of 
Beauvais, Speculum, Book 5, cap. 17 (both cited above, n. 15). 
64  Following Fyler (Language, 151), Havely notes that both Chaucer and Holcot refer to 
multiplication in this context (n. to lines 787–822, 184–85), but he also suggests that “There 
may be an allusion here to Robert Grosseteste” (n. to line 784, 184), on the grounds that 
“‘multiplication of species’ or ‘virtue’ was part of his [Grosseteste’s] optical theory”. This 
comparison does not seem to me particularly compelling – or at least not so compelling as the 
comparison with Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary. Nor am I persuaded by Havely’s further 
suggestion (in his n. to line 784) that Chaucer’s “interest in the notion of multiplicity (versus 
 
precedent for this in Boethius, Vincent or Averroes: however, Holcot says: “In the 
same way [as in the case of the ripples on the water], when sound is created in the air 
by the impact of something on something else, then that sound is multiplied, and it 
generates another sound, and this other sound generates another sound [and so on], 
radiating outwards, as long as the strength of the initial impact lasts” (“Eodem modo, 
quando65 ex percutiente et percusso66 sit sonus in aere, ille sonus multiplicatur et sonus 
iste generat alium et ille alium67 circulariter, quamdiu durat virtus primi percutientis”: 
Lection 193: V, fol. 164rb; O, fol. 286va). Holcot’s particular emphasis on both 
“cause” and “multiplication” in his account of the ripples on the water seems to be 
the immediate explanation for the Eagle’s prominent repetition of these very terms 
in the course of his own use of this analogy (which I cite here with these key words 
in bold): 
 
Now, hennes-forth y wol the teche 
How every speche or noyse or soun, 
Thurgh hys multiplicacioun, 
Thogh hyt were piped of a mouse, 
Mote nede come to Fames house. 
I preve hyt thus (take hede now) 
 
unity) may well have been further stimulated by his reading about unity and diversity in Book 
3 of Boethius’s Cons[olation of Philosophy] (cf. Boece 3, prosa II. 16–73)”. 
65  quando] HV; O om. 
66  percusso] HV; percussio O 
67  ille alium] HV; ille alius alium O 
By experience – for yf that thow 
Throwe on water now a stoon, 
Wel wost thou, hyt wol make anoon 
A litel roundell, as a sercle – 
Peraventure brode as a covercle – 
And ryght anoon thow shalt see wel,  
That sercle wol cause another whele 
And that the thridde, and so forth, brother, 
Every sercle causynge other, 
Wydder than hym self was. 
And thus, fro roundel to compas, 
Eche aboute other goynge, 
Causeth of othres sterynge, 
And multiplyinge ever moo, 
Til that hyt be so fer y-goo 
That hyt at bothe brynkes bee. […] 
As I have of the watir preved – 
That every cercle causeth other – 
Ryght so of ayre, my leve brother: 
Everych ayre other stereth 
More and more, and speche upbereth, 
Or voys or noyse or worde or soun, 
Ay through multiplicacioun, 
Til hyt be atte House of Fame… (House of Fame, 782–803, 814–21) 
 These parallels are suggestive in themselves, and they clearly indicate that, even if 
Chaucer were aware of the use of the ripples-on-the-water analogy by Boethius, 
Vincent of Beauvais or Averroes, it is probably Holcot whose influence on Chaucer 
at this point was most direct. Yet it is perhaps the broader context in which Holcot 
discusses the physics of sound that is most suggestive about the nature of the 
relationship between the two English writers. Holcot’s discussion of the nature of 
sound in the Wisdom-commentary comes as part of his analysis of “Echo”, which, he 
emphasizes, is open to discussion from at least two distinct perspectives, the one 
“natural” (naturale, or what might be called “scientific”) and the other “fabulous” 
(fabulosum, i.e. derived from classical mythology): “Circa generationem Echo 
notanda68 sunt duo: vnum est naturale, aliud fabulosum” (Lection 193: V, fol. 164ra; 
O, fol. 286rb). Having offered us his account of the “natural” approach to the theme 
of echoes (by means of the analogy with the ripples on the water), Holcot then 
switches directly to the “fabulous”: 
Fabulose loquendo 69 Echo narrat Ouidius .iii. Methamorphoses. 70  Fuit enim 
virgo quedam mire eloquentie, que Junonem longa narratione 71  detinere 
solebat, dummodo Jupiter in montibus adulteria sua fecit cum puellis. 
Impediebatur igitur Juno per narrationes ipsius Echo ne deprehendere posset 
 
68  notanda] HV; videnda O 
69  fabulose loquendo] HV; fabulosum ortum ipsius O 
70  Ovid, Metamorphoses, III.359–510, ed./trans Frank Justus Miller, 2 vols (Cambridge MA: Loeb, 
1984), 1: 148–61. 
71  longa narratione] HV; longis narrationibus O 
istas puellas, ipsis fugientibus Junone detenta per narrationes ipsius Echo. 
Tandem Juno hoc percepto, “‘Huius’ ait, ‘lingue que sum decepta72 potestas./ 
Parua 73  tibi dabitur 74  vocisque breuissimus vsus.’” 75  Priuauit eam vsu 
loquendi, hoc solum sibi relinquens quod fines verborum ingeminat. Hec 
ergo Echo Narcissum iuuenem adamauit pulcherrimum, sed 76  ab eo 
repellitur. “Spreta latet siluis pudibundaque77 frondibus ora/ Protegit et solus 
ex illo viuit in antris.”78 Fatigans79 igitur eam amore, dolore et pudore cuius80 
corpus totum euanuit preter vocem et ossa. Ossa vero conuersa sunt in saxa 
et tandem81 sola vox remansit que vocatur “Echo”. (Lection 193: V, fol. 
164rb; O, fol. 286va) 
In mythological terms, Ovid tells the story of Echo in the third book of 
Metamorphoses. There was once a young woman of wonderful eloquence, who 
was accustomed to detain Juno with long drawn-out story-telling all the time 
that Jupiter was in the mountains committing adultery with his girlfriends. In 
 
72  decepta] HVO; delusa Ovid 
73  Parua] Ovid; Praua HVO 
74  Dabitur] Ovid, O; Datur HV 
75  Ovid, Metamorphoses, III.366–67, ed./trans. Miller, 1:150–51.  
76  sed] HV; O om. 
77  pudibundaque] HV; putibundaque O 
78  Ovid, Metamorphoses, III.393–94, ed./trans. Miller, 1:152–53. 
79  Fatigans] Ovid; Fatigantibus HVO 
80  cuius] HV; O om. 
81  tandem] HV; sic tandem O 
this way Juno was prevented by the stories of this Echo from being able to 
catch any of these girls, for they fled from her while she was being detained 
by Echo’s stories. “‘That tongue of thine [she said], by which I have been 
[deceived] shall have its power curtailed and enjoy the briefest use of 
speech.” Juno deprived Echo of the power of speech leaving her only the 
power to repeat the ends of words. So then this Echo fell in love with the 
beautiful Narcissus, but was rejected by him. “Thus spurned, she lurks in the 
woods, hides her shamed face among the foliage, and lives from that time on 
in lonely caves.” In this way exhausted by love, grief and shame, her whole 
body vanished [into thin air] apart from her voice and bones.82 Her bones 
were changed into rocks, and at length only her voice remained, which is 
what we call “Echo”. 
In essence, what Holcot does here is to yoke together precisely the same two modes 
of thinking that come together to such incongruous effect in the Eagle’s speech in 
The House of Fame: that is, the naturale and the fabulosum – the “scientific” and the 
“mythological”. Just as Holcot chooses to read Echo both as a phenomenon in 
nature and as an invitation to analyse the moral dimensions of the classical legend of 
Echo, so too Chaucer presents us with the Eagle, who is simultaneously both a 
vehicle for what seems to be a determinedly scientific account of the mechanics of 
sound and a figure straight out of classical mythology. In other words, what Holcot 
 
82  Cf. the Franklin’s Tale, V. 951–52: “And dye he moste, he seyde, as dide Ekko/For Narcisus, 
that dorste nat telle hir wo.” 
offers Chaucer here is a precedent not just for the particular analogy of the ripples on 
the water, but also for the explicit conjunction of “mythology” with “science”.83  
Such conjunctions are by no means unusual in the Wisdom-commentary. Another 
example can be found in Lection 187, where Holcot discusses Ovid’s 
characterisation of the House of Envy in the second book of the Metamorphoses. 
According to Holcot: 
Vult ergo dicere quod domus inuidie est situata in vallibus pro tanto quod84 
persone humiles inuident85 superioribus, et omnis inuidus ideo inuidet, quia 
se inferiorem alio in aliquo quod appetit esse videt. Inferior planeta eclipsat 
superiorem, et non econtra, sicut patet de luna et sole, et ita regulariter illi qui 
minus valent et sunt gratiis et meritis inferiores obumbrare nituntur per 
inuidiam meliores. (Lection 187: V, fol. 159ra; O, fol. 277rb–va) 
[Ovid] chooses to say that the House of Envy is situated in a valley [in 
vallibus]86 because of the way that lesser folk envy their superiors; and every 
 
83  I should emphasise that this reading of Holcot’s influence on Chaucer is not intended to be 
exclusive. There are other medieval authors who make use of something like this conjuncture 
of the naturale and the fabulosum: see, for example, the Roman de la Rose, lines 18013–18091, ed. 
Daniel Poirion (Paris: Flammarion, 1974), 481–82, where references to scientific authorities 
like Aristotle and Alhazen are pointedly juxtaposed with mythological figures like Mars and 
Venus. 
84  quod] HV; quia O 
85  inuident] HV; semper inuident O 
86  Ovid, Metamorphoses, II.761–62, ed./trans Miller, 1:112–113: “domus est imis in vallibus 
huius/ abdita” (“her home was hidden away in a deep valley”). 
envious person is envious because he sees himself to be inferior to another in 
something that he desires. A lesser planet eclipses a greater, not vice versa, 
just as is clear in regard to the sun and the moon: and so it regularly happens 
that those who are worth less, and are inferior in their virtues and their merits 
strive to overshadow their betters through envy. 
Here again we find that seemingly incongruous conjunction between the fabulosum 
and the naturale: between the imaginative world of classical literature, that is, and the 
physical world of bodies moving in the cosmos. As it happens, Chaucer’s description 
of the House of Fame’s nearby annex, the House of Rumour, also includes the idea 
that it was situated in a valley (“Tho saugh I stond in a valeye,/ Under the castel, fast 
by,/ An house”: 1918–20), and it is possible that Chaucer was particularly 
encouraged to include this detail by its prominence in Holcot’s discussion of Ovid’s 
allegorical architecture, as well as – or possibly even wholly instead of – Ovid’s own 
text. Just as Holcot here uses the idea of movement of planets in eclipses in order to 
explain the architecture of a particular ethical/mythical construct (the House of 
Envy), so too, it could be argued, Chaucer uses the idea of the physical movements 
of sound-waves in order to explain the architecture of what is, in effect, a parallel and 
related concept (the House of Fame).  
 
IV. THE PLACE OF ROBERT HOLCOT IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY 
INTELLECTUAL CULTURE 
 
What, however, is the wider significance of these correspondences? What is the 
nature of the relationship between Chaucer and Holcot – or for that matter, between 
Holcot and Grosseteste, Burley or the Oxford Calculators? Born around 1290, 
Robert Holcot was a contemporary of many of the Calculators: his career, like those 
of two of the most important Calculators, Bradwardine and Dumbleton, was cut 
short by the Black Death of 1348/1349. In Oxford from at least 1326, he held the 
Dominican chair of theology there in 1334, followed by a second regency in 
Cambridge; and at some point after this he became part of the literary and book-
collecting circle that gathered around the Bishop of Durham, Richard Bury.87 Bury is 
now best known to literary history as the putative author of a work called Philobiblon 
(or The Love of Books),88 although in fact there is some evidence that Holcot was also 
involved in its authorship, to the extent that “we shall never know […]  how much 
of Philobiblon is Holcot’s and how much de Bury’s”.89 The group around Bury is 
described in the Dictionary of National Biography as “the single most notable circle or 
sequence of scholars under the patronage of one person in fourteenth-century 
England.” Among its members were the Oxford Calculators Thomas Bradwardine 
and Richard Kilvington – and also Walter Burley. 90  Some idea of this circle’s 
 
87  On Bury, see N. Denholm-Young, “Richard de Bury (1287–1345),” Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 4th Series, Vol. 20 (1937): 135–168; Christopher R. Cheney, “Richard de Bury, 
Borrower of Books,” Speculum 48 (1973): 325–28; W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 133–37; 
W. J. Courtenay, “Bury, Richard (1287–1345),” ODNB, article 4153.  
88  Philobiblon: Richard de Bury: The Text and Translation of E.C. Thomas, ed. Michael Maclagan 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1970). 
89  Smalley, English Friars, 67. See, however, Maclagan, xxxv–xxxvii. 
90  In addition to these three men (and of course Holcot), Bury’s “household” between 1334 and 
1345 seems to have included such figures as Richard Bentworth, Richard Fitzralph, Walter 
Segrave, John Maudith and John Aton. On Fitzralph, see Katherine Walsh, Richard Fitzralph in 
 
activities might be deduced from the Philobiblon, where Bury says (or is imagined by 
Holcot to say): 
…ab aetate tenera magistrorum et scholarium ac diversarum artium 
professorum quos ingenii perspicacitas ac doctrinae celebritas clariores 
effecerant, relegato quolibet partiali favore, exquisitissima sollicitudine 
nostrae semper coniunximus comitivae, quorum consolativis colloquiis 
confortati, nunc argumentorum ostensivis investigationibus, nunc 
physicorum processuum ac catholicorum doctorum tractatuum 
recitationibus, nunc moralitatum excitativis collationibus, velut alternatis et 
multiplicatis ingenii ferculis, dulcius fovebamur. 
From our early years we attached to our society with the most exquisite 
solicitude and discarding all partiality all such masters and scholars and 
professors in the several faculties as had become most distinguished by their 
subtlety of mind and the fame of their learning. Deriving consolation from 
their sympathetic conversation, we were delightfully entertained, now by 
demonstrative chains of reasoning, now by the recital of the physical 
processes and the treatises of the doctors of the Church, now by stimulating 
 
Oxford, Avignon and Armagh (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), and “Fitzralph, Richard (b. before 
1300, d. 1360),” ODNB, article 9267; on Maudith, J. D. North, “Maudith , John (d. in or after 
1343),” ODNB, article 18362; on Aton, F. Donald Logan, “Aton, John (d. 1349),” ODNB, 
article 75. 
discourses on the allegorical meaning of things as by a rich and well-varied 
intellectual feast.91 
The recital of the “physical processes” (physicum processuum) mentioned here might 
even be read as a direct reference to something very like the scientifically educational 
lecture that Chaucer’s Eagle attempts to provide; while the moralitatum excitative 
collationes (literally, “stimulating assemblages of moral ideas”) clearly imply a reference 
to some form of allegory, as E.C. Thomas’s translation assumes (“stimulating 
discourses on the allegorical meaning of things”).  
While Holcot is very likely to have known Burley personally (as a fellow member 
of the Bury circle), the evidence is also very strong that he knew at least some of 
Grosseteste’s work. Apart from anything else, he says that he did. He refers directly 
to Grosseteste as “Linconiensis” (i.e. as Bishop of Lincoln) in his Commentary on 
Peter Lombard’s Sentences;92 and in Lection 83 of the Wisdom-commentary, he copied 
 
91  Philobiblon, ed. Maclagan, 86–87. 
92  Holcot, Commentary on the Sentences, II, q. 2: “Aliter aliqui dicunt ad istud argumentum quod 
vna multitudo infinita est maior alia: et concedunt quod plures fuerent reuolutiones lune 
quam solis. Dicunt etiam quod sicut inter ternarium et binarium est sesquialtera proportio: ita 
inter ternarios infinitos et binarios infinitos est sesquialtera proportio: et infinito potest fieri 
additio. Et hec opinio est Linconiensis super librum physicorum.” According to Pierre 
Duhem: “The last assertion seems completely false: Robert Grosseteste says nothing not 
purely Aristotelian on the subject of the infinite in his Summa (which is so concise, so full of 
ideas), and nothing in particular that resembles what Holkot attributes to him” (Pierre Duhem: 
Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Words, ed./trans. Roger 
Ariew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 103). Duhem’s view is contradicted by 
Neil Lewis (“Robert Grosseteste’s Notes on Physics,” 120), who interprets this passage as a 
 
an extensive passage almost verbatim from Grosseteste’s Dictum 91, which he also 
ascribes to “Linconiensis”. 93  In addition, Lection 100 includes a whole section 
borrowed word for word from Grosseteste’s Dictum 60, although here Holcot seems 
to have thought that he was quoting from the work of Alexander Nequam.94 From 
this perspective, Grennen’s suggestion of Chaucer’s indebtedness to Burley and 
Grosseteste is not so far off the mark after all. Whether or not Chaucer knew the 
work of either of these authors directly, it seems that he had access, in Holcot, to 
someone who largely shared their intellectual horizons. 
These days, however, Holcot is probably best known, not for his membership of 
the Bury Circle, or for his knowledge of Grosseteste, but for the leading part he plays 
in two other important fourteenth-century contexts.95 Firstly, he is generally regarded 
 
direct reference to Grosseteste’s Notes on Physics – although he mistakenly refers to Holcot as 
“John Holcot”. 
93  The passage in question occupies most of the final third of Holcot’s Lectio 83. An edition of 
Grosseteste’s Dictum 91 can be found at the Electronic Grosseteste web-site (cited above, n. 19): 
the material borrowed by Holcot can be found at fols 69vb–70ra in the base-text for this 
edition, Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Bodley 798. 
94  The relevant passages are printed below, in the Appendix. On Dictum 60, see also Servus 
Gieben, “Traces of God in Nature according to Robert Grosseteste,” Franciscan Studies 24 
(1964): 144–58. 
95  From the point of view of the history of English literature, Holcot is also interesting as the 
only medieval writer who apparently shows a knowledge of the first long comic poem in the 
English language, the thirteenth-century poem known as The Owl and the Nightingale (ed./trans. 
Neil Cartlidge (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2001; repr. 2003)). This observation was 
 
as one of the principal theological antagonists of Thomas Bradwardine: specifically, 
as one of the philosophers that Bradwardine chose to represent in De causa Dei as 
“Pelagians” (that is, philosophical sceptics in the tradition of Ockham), and against 
whom the De causa Dei was apparently directed.96 For Bradwardine, whose views on 
the relationship between divine grace and human free will could certainly be said to 
veer towards theological determinism, Holcot seems to have been something of a bête 
noire, since, even by the standards of Ockham’s followers, Holcot’s scepticism was 
particularly strongly stated. 97 In his Sentences-commentary he even argued for the 
 
made by Alan J. Fletcher in “The Genesis of The Owl and the Nightingale: A New Hypothesis,” 
Chaucer Review 34 (1999): 1–17, at 2–4. 
96  See Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of his ‘De Causa Dei’ and its Opponents 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), esp. 221; Baker, “Literature, Logic and 
Mathematics,” 49, 107–32; William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 294–303; Calvin 
Normore, “Future Contingents,” in Norman Kretzmann, et al. (eds), The Cambridge History of 
Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 358-81, at 373–77; 
Lukács, 33–36. On Holcot’s relationship with Ockham, see E.A. Moody, “A Quodlibetal 
Question of Robert Holkot, O.P. on the Problem of the Objects of Knowledge and of 
Belief,” Speculum 39 (1964): 53–74. 
97  Cf. Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary, Lectio 147 (V, fol. 128rb; O [here Lection 148], fol. 
222vb): “Multi confitentur iniquitatem suam, sed aduersus Deum. Quando enim inueniuntur 
in peccatis, [non (O; HV om.)] dicunt ‘Non feci hoc, aut non est hoc peccatum’, sed ‘Deus 
voluit’. Alii dicunt, fatum mihi fecit. Stelle mihi fecerunt et ita per circuitum nituntur venire ad 
accusandum Deum. Stellas enim ipse fecit et ordinauit.’ Et ita per eas voluit ostendere quod 
Deus fecit vt peccarent. Sed vere penitens dicit ‘Ego peccaui, non fatum, non fortuna, non 
Diabolus me coegit: sed ego persuadenti consensi.’ Hec Glosa: Vere igitur penitentes 
 
rather disconcerting proposition that God can lie and deceive, and that he can do so 
without impairing his perfection in any way.98 Such anti-determinism may well have 
appealed rather strongly to Chaucer, the poet who includes in Book IV of Troilus and 
Criseyde an extended illustration of the folly of narrow fatalism.99 Secondly, Holcot is 
known for his membership of group that Beryl Smalley long ago labelled as the 
“classicizing friars”: a group of English writers characterized by a conspicuous 
penchant for incorporating classical material into what were essentially devotional 
and pastoral texts. Smalley considered Holcot the most “diversely gifted” of all these 
fraternal writers: and indeed “no medieval moralist”, she adds, “ever had a stronger 
sense of humour” than Holcot did.100 The Wisdom-commentary is an undeniably 
engaging and accessible text, as well as an instructive one, which means that it is not 
hard to see why it eventually became, in Jenny Swanson’s words, “one of the most 
popular commentaries of the late middle ages”.101 As Swanson explains, it “made 
[Holcot’s] name famous throughout medieval Europe, and surviving catalogues show 
 
precogitant et deliberant quomodo possint semetipsos accusare: [sed (O; HV om.)] false 
penitentes deliberant quomodo possint Deum accusare [et excusare seipsos (O; HV om.)].” 
98  Holcot, Commentary on the Sentences: “nullum inconveniens video si dicatur quod Deus 
possit iurare falsum vel promittere se facturum et non facere, sicut potest homo”; Baker, 
“Literature, Logic and Mathematics,” 117–18. 
99  On Troilus’s fatalism in Troilus and Criseyde, see A.J. Minnis, Chaucer and Pagan Antiquity 
(Cambridge: Brewer, 1982), 93–99. 
100  Smalley, English Friars, 73. On Holcot’s sense of humour, see also Katherine H. Tachau, 
“Looking Gravely at Dominican Puns: the ‘Sermons’ of Robert Holcot and Ralph Friseby,” 
Traditio 46 (1991): 337–345. 
101  Jenny Swanson, “Holcot, Robert (c. 1290–1349),” ODNB, article 13485. 
that every well-stocked library came to have a copy.”102 Nevertheless, the book’s 
popularity waned in the sixteenth century; and the Wisdom-commentary is now 
(arguably) the most widely circulated and culturally significant medieval English text 
never to have appeared in a complete modern edition. 
 
V. HOLCOT AND CHAUCER 
The possibility that Chaucer was a reader of Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary has, in 
fact, long been recognised. Some of the strongest evidence for it comes from the fact 
that Chaucer’s discussion of dreams and their significance in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale 
seems to have been substantially influenced by several passages in the Wisdom-
commentary. Both of the stories told by the cock Chauntecleer in support of the idea 
that dreams can be predictive of the future are found in the commentary (Lections 
102 and 201);103 and it was probably directly from Holcot that Chaucer took them, 
rather than Holcot’s own principal source, Valerius Maximus. Indeed, Robert Pratt 
asserts that: 
 
102  Cf. J.C. Wey, “The Sermo finalis of Robert Holcot,” Mediaeval Studies 11 (1949): 219–23, at 219: 
“As the author of [the…] commentary on the Book of Wisdom Holcot became famous over 
night and his fame held throughout the next two centuries.” 
103  Kate O. Petersen, On the Sources of the ‘Nonnes Preestes Tale’ (Boston: Radcliffe College, 1892); 
Robert A. Pratt, “Some Latin Sources of the Nonnes Preest on Dreams,” Speculum 52 (1977): 
538–70. Pratt refers to these Lectiones as 103 and 202 (rather than 102 and 201) because he 
based his reading of Holcot primarily the manuscript-copy of the Wisdom-commentary in 
Oxford, Balliol College MS 27 [O], where the numbering is slightly different. 
In Holcot’s fascinating Wisdom commentary [Chaucer would have] found 
opposing views on dreams and divination which he developed into 
stupendous mock-heroic discourses. He rifled Holcot – especially the 
sections on significative dreams – for Pertelote’s discussion of humors and 
for most of Chauntecleer’s argument.104 
Given the energy with which Pratt argues for Chaucer’s dependence on the Wisdom-
commentary for his material on dreams and divination, it seems rather surprising that 
Chaucerians have not sought more intensively for further examples of Chaucer’s 
“rifling” of Holcot. 105  I have recently tried to lend support to Pratt’s case for 
 
104  Pratt, “Some Latin Sources,” 569. 
105  In the past A.J. Minnis has presented Chaucer’s knowledge of the Wisdom-commentary as a 
certainty, stating bluntly that “[Robert Holcot’s…] popular commentary on the Book of 
Wisdom was known to Chaucer” (Chaucer and Pagan Antiquity, 3); cf. Medieval Theory of 
Authorship, 165: “Chaucer seems to have made use of Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary when 
writing his House of Fame and the Nun’s Priest’s Tale”. In support of these assertions he cites 
Petersen and Pratt (see n. 101 above), and (for the House of Fame) Sypherd, Studies, 74–76, but 
adds no specific evidence of Chaucer’s use of Holcot himself. More recently, his views seem 
to have shifted a little: he expresses scepticism about Pratt’s case for Chaucer’s use of Holcot, 
but adds “let that pass for now: in principle I see no reason why Chaucer should or could not 
have read Holcot’s Wisdom commentary” (“Looking for a Sign: the Quest for Nominalism in 
Ricardian poetry,” in Translations of Authority in Medieval English Literature: Valuing the Vernacular 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38–67, at 40). William H. Watts argues that 
“the case for Holcot’s influence on Chaucer is less clear-cut than the near-universal 
acceptance of the Wisdom Commentary as a source for The Nun’s Priest’s Tale would seem to 
suggest. While Petersen and Pratt are able to point to parallels between the Commentary and 
 
Chaucer’s knowledge of Holcot by pointing out that the friar’s influence is probably 
directly visible in the rather austere attitude that Chaucer takes in the Canterbury Tales 
towards parental, and particularly paternal, responsibility. So, for example, there is a 
close correspondence between Chaucer’s Physician’s warning that parents should be 
careful not to encourage immorality in their children either “by ensample of youre 
lyvynge/Or by youre necligence in chastisynge” and Holcot’s assertion in Lection 41 
that when children turn out to be immoral it is either “Tum propter parentum 
imitationem, tum propter defectum castigationis” (either due to imitating their 
parents, or to a lack of chastisement).106 It is also the case that in the Merchant’s Tale 
January’s assertion that a man ought to “Take… a wyf with greet devocioun,/ By 
 
the Tale, there is little in Chaucer’s work that must of necessity come from Holcot. The 
argument for Holcot’s influence rests largely on similarities on verbal choices, in the structure 
of the argument, and in the narrative details Chauntecleer deploys in the exemplary tales that 
support his case for the prophetic value of dreams, but it would seem that these similarities 
can be accounted for without resorting to Holcot”; and he suggests (unconvincingly in my 
view) that Chaucer is unlikely to have made use of the works of clerks like Holcot if only 
because “we find in Chaucer’s poetry, a kind of anti-clericalism, focused not on the worldly 
abuses of the religious orders but on the hubris and misdirected studies of clerks” (“Chaucer’s 
Clerks and the Value of Philosophy,” in Nominalism and Literary Discourse: New Perspectives, ed. 
Hugo Keiper, Christoph Bode and Richard J. Utz (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 145–55, at 
152–53). More recently, Peter Brown has argued that the influence of Holcot’s Wisdom-
commentary is visible in Chaucer’s treatment of optics (Chaucer and the Making of Optical Space 
(Bern: Lang, 2007), esp. pp. 107–108, 159–60, 311). 
106  Neil Cartlidge, “Wayward Sons and Failing Fathers: Chaucer’s Moralistic Paternalism – and a 
Possible Source for the Cook’s Tale,” Chaucer Review 47 (2012): 134–60, at 146–47. 
cause of leveful procreacioun/ Of children to th’onour of God above” at least 
resembles the phrasing of Holcot’s argument in Lection 37 that the generation of 
children should occur within the boundaries of marriage ‘in order to honour God’ 
(“prolis propagatio ad laudem Dei”).107 A further close verbal correspondence can be 
found in the two writers’ accounts of the story of Phaethon. Chaucer concludes his 
version by asking: 
 
Loo, ys it not a mochil myschaunce 
To lat a fool han governaunce 
Of thing that he can not demeyne? (House of Fame, lines 957–59) 
 
The particular phrasing of this rhetorical question seems to be a direct reflection of 
Holcot’s observation in Lection 8 of the Wisdom-commentary that “This is what 
might happen to those fools and presumptuous people who complain about divine 
governance” (“Ita contingeret de istis fatuis et presumptuosis qui de diuina gubernatione 
murmurant”; my italics).108 However, the case for Chaucer’s dependence on Holcot 
rests not just on close verbal correspondences such as these, but also on the sheer 
accumulation of themes and motifs common to the two writers. So, for example, in 
Lection 191 of the Wisdom-Commentary, Holcot tells the story of Ceyx and Alcyone, 
which Chaucer also uses in the Book of the Duchess (lines 62–230). In Lection 197, he 
discusses the “Dulcarnoun”, the Euclidian axiom to which Pandarus makes reference 
 
107  Cartlidge, “Wayward Sons,” 147, n. 35. 
108 Lection 8: V, fol. 9vb. This sentence is in a passage omitted in O. 
in Troilus and Criseyde (III.931).109 And in Lection 16, he cites the case of the poet 
who is so moved by his feelings as to address his beloved’s deserted house (the 
rhetorical device of paraclausithyron) much as Troilus does in Troilus and Criseyde 
(V.540–53).110 In these cases, the verbal correspondences are not so close as to add 
much weight individually to the idea that Chaucer was making use of the Wisdom-
commentary, but cumulatively they support the impression that, intellectually and 
imaginatively, the two writers inhabited very much the same world.  
In the light of all this, the most efficient explanation for the parallels between 
Chaucer’s use of the ripples-on-the-water analogy and Holcot’s use of this same 
analogy is surely that Chaucer knew the Wisdom-commentary, and that he used it in 
the composition of the Eagle’s speech. Indeed, many of the general principles of the 
Eagle’s physics are at least implicit in Holcot’s commentary;111 and there is probably 
no need to assume that Chaucer’s learning (either in classical literature or in 
fourteenth-century physics) necessarily extended very much beyond it. It may be that 
Chaucerian scholars have actually played into the poet’s hands by attempting to 
 
109  See Thomas Elwood Hart, “Medieval Structuralism: ‘Dulcarnoun’ and the Five-Book Design 
of Chaucer’s ‘Troilus’,” Chaucer Review 16 (1981): 129–70; and Baker, “Literature, Logic and 
Mathematics,” 178–80. 
110  This particular parallel was noted by Smalley (English Friars, 169–70). See also Morton W. 
Bloomfield, “Troilus’ Paraclausithyron and Its Setting,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 73 (1972): 
15–24. He discusses the possibility that Chaucer was at this point borrowing from Holcot at 
18–19, remarking: “It now seems very probable that Chaucer knew Holcot’s Commentary on 
Wisdom which was one of the popular works of the later fourteenth century” (18). 
111  Cf. e.g. “Lyghte thinge upwarde, and dounwarde charge” (House of Fame, lines 746) and 
Holcot’s “Locus autem grauium est deorsum” (Holcot, Wisdom-commentary, Lectio 188). 
identify his sources only in authorities much grander and more remote than the 
English friar. No doubt Chaucer would have been quite pleased to be credited with 
such deep erudition that he would have needed no guide to the thinking of such 
ancient intellectual eminences as Aristotle or Boethius.112 However in the Wisdom-
commentary he would certainly have found just such a guide. It would have provided 
him with a convenient and engagingly presented digest of themes and motifs 
gathered from a wide range of difference sources, which probably did much more to 
define his intellectual horizons than he would have liked to admit. At the same time, 
it could be argued that Chaucer’s greatest debt to Holcot lies not so much in his 
adoption of any particular themes or motifs, as in what he learned from him about 
how to exploit them for literary effect: that is, in Holcot’s demonstration of the very 
possibilities implicit in learned eclecticism as a kind of literary practice. What Holcot 
showed Chaucer, in particular, was how it might be possible to generate intellectual 
energy and a sense of abundance from the inventive juxtaposition of distinctly 
different kinds of authority. For Holcot, demonstrative eclecticism was a means of 
attracting and keeping the attention of his readers, and also of showing those readers 
(most of them, implicitly, clerks) how they too might attract and maintain the 
attention of their own congregations when they came to write sermons or lectures in 
their turn: but it also seems to be something of an end in itself, a challenge to his 
 
112  On Chaucer’s “emphasis on ancient authority and silence or obfuscation” in relation to his 
true sources, and the precedents for such a practice that he might have found in another 
writer whose own influence he signally fails to acknowledge (in this case Giovanni 
Boccaccio), see B.A. Windeatt, Oxford Guides to Chaucer: Troilus and Criseyde (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992; repr. 1995), 39–40. 
ingenuity and intellectual flamboyance at least as much as it was a means of 
exhibiting the breadth of his reading. It is perhaps in a very similar spirit that 
Chaucer incorporates his own displays of demonstrative, compilator-ish bookishness 
into his poetry – as, for example, here in the Eagle’s speech in the House of Fame, but 
also recurrently throughout his work. 113 Thus, although it is possible, and indeed 
likely, that Chaucer quarried Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary directly for some of the 
details of the Eagle’s speech, what is perhaps most significant here is what he learned 
from Holcot in terms of literary technique. It may well have been Holcot in 
particular who encouraged Chaucer to imagine the Eagle precisely in the way he did: 
as a figure embodying in its very conception a clash between two very different types 
of authority, the classical/mythological and the scientific – the fabulosum and the 
naturale. Holcot is not just a source for Chaucer’s acoustics, in other words, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, a model for the cultivated incongruity of making 
Jupiter’s Eagle into an expert on physics in the first place. From this perspective, the 
Eagle’s speech is not so much an illustration of Chaucer’s Aristotelianism, as of his 
Holcotianism. 
 
113  Cf. A.J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, 2nd edn (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988), 
191: “Of Chaucer’s debt to several of the great medieval compilations there can be no doubt. 
[…] My point is a different one, namely, that Chaucer was indebted to the compilers not only 
for their source-material and technical information but also for a literary role and a literary 
form. Chaucer seems to have have exploited the compilers’ typical justification of their 
characteristic role as writers, and to have shared, to some extent, the compilers’ sense of 
ordinatio partium.” See also Ralph Hanna III, “Compilatio and the Wife of Bath: Latin 
Backgrounds, Ricardian Texts,” in Pursuing History: Middle English Manuscripts and Their Texts 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 247–57. 
 APPENDIX: HOLCOT’S USE OF GROSSETESTE114 
 
1. Holcot, Lection 100:115 
Omnibus enim mobilibus mobilior est sapientia. Attingit autem ubique propter mundiciam 
suam. Vapor enim est virtutis dei, et emanatio quedam est claritatatis116 omnipotentis dei sincera, 
et ideo nihil inquinatum in illam incurrit. [Sap. 24, 24-25] […] Sicut 117  enim deducit 
magister Alexander cognomento 118  Nequam: In omni creatura corporea 
quantumcumque sit modica, potest119 ratio humana videre infinitam Dei potentiam, 
infinitam sapientiam et bonitatem. Verbi gratia, ut de atomo fiat exemplum. Satis 
enim approbat humana ratio et acceptat quod mensura potentie agentis sumatur 
secundum proportionem facti ad illud de quo fit. Tanta enim videtur potentia 
facilitatis, quantum ipsum factum excedit illud de quo fit. Cum ergo ratio inuenerit 
atomum esse aliquid ex nihilo et sciat quod, si atomus excederet, nihil [ad] 120 
infinitum excederet, concludit quod potentia ducens atomum de nihilo ad esse est 
infinita. Secundo videbit ratio quod121 cum atomus sit corpus, habet inter se tres 
 
114  The translations here are mine. 
115  V, fol. 88rb; O, fol. 153vb–154ra. 
116  claritatis] Vulgate; claritas HVO 
117 Sicut] HV; Sed O 
118 cognomento] HV; O om. 
119 potest] HV; valoris potest O 
120  ad] HV om.; in O 
121  quod] VO; H om. 
lineas intersecantes se ad angulos rectos: in qua sectione posito circino conscribi 
potest sphera super122 atomum et videt in sphera infinitos circulos posse describi; 
immo infinita corpora infra spheram esse imaginabilia, et vltra infra circulos omnes 
figuras fore inscriptibiles, que tamen sunt infinite, super quas infinite possunt erigi 
demonstrationes, tam de magnitudinibus, quam de numeris. Ergo videbit ratio 
humana in atomo vel in flore infinitam scientiam objectiue descriptam. Infinitam 
vero scientiam non potest descripsisse agens quodcumque nisi sapientie infinite. 
Ergo humana ratio, si est bona, videbit et 123  inveniet in vno atomo infinitam 
sapientiam Conditoris. 
 
For wisdom is more active than all active things: and reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity. 
For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty 
God: and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her. […] Indeed this was the reasoning of 
Master Alexander Nequam: that in every created body no matter how small, human 
reason can perceive the infinite power of God, his infinite wisdom and goodness. 
This is illustrated, for example, by the atom. Human reason readily sees and accepts 
that the productive power of anything can be measured as an amount equivalent to 
the proportion of the [value of] of what is produced to [the value of] what it is 
produced with. The extent to which [the value of] the actual product exceeds [the 
value of] what it is produced with is an index of the agent’s effective power. 
Therefore, since it is reasonable to assume that an atom is something [produced] 
from nothing, and that, if the atom exceeds [what it is produced with], then it 
 
122 super] HV; infra O 
123  videbit et] HV; O om. 
exceeds nothing to an infinite extent, so the conclusion must be that the power 
required to call into being [even] an atom out of nothing is infinite. Secondly, reason 
will see that since an atom has a body, it must have within itself three intersecting 
lines at right angles [i.e. it is three-dimensional]. With the compasses placed at this 
point, a sphere can be drawn around this atom, and [reason] sees that within the 
sphere an infinite number of circles can be drawn; indeed an infinite number of 
bodies are imaginable within the sphere, and moreover, within these circles every 
shape drawable can be placed (but the number of these is infinite); and on this might 
be rested an infinite number of proofs, both in relation to magnitudes and to 
numbers. Thus human reason will see even in a flower or an atom the infinity of 
knowledge objectively depicted. Indeed the infinity of knowledge could not be 
described by any agent, except that of infinite wisdom. Therefore, human reason (as 
long as it is good) will see and discover in even a single atom the infinite wisdom of 
the Creator. 
 
2. Grossesteste, Dictum 60:124 
Videbit enim racio investigans, quod omnis potencia mensuratur per proporcionem 
facti ad illud ex quo fit. Tanta est enim facientis potencia, quanto factum excedit illud 
ex quo fit. Omne autem aliquid, quantumcumque vile et parvum, [in]125 infinitum 
excedit nichilum. Igitur, cum racio invenerit attomum esse aliquid ex nichilo, et 
 
124  The text is taken from the Electronic Grosseteste (cited above, n. 19) [henceforth eG], which is in 
turn based on Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Bodley 798, fols 47rb-vb. 
125  in] eG om. The Hagenau text of the Wisdom-commentary seems to share the same error at this 
point as the copy of the Dictum that the eG uses as its base-witness. 
decurrerit ab eo ad potenciam facientis, mensuraveritque eam per proporcionem facti 
ad illud ex quo fit, videbit attomum egressum in esse non a minori quam ab infinita 
potencia. Sic igitur egressus attomi in esse aliquid ex nichilo similacrum est infinite 
potencie efficientis. 
Item, racio eadem considerans amplius inveniet attomum esse corpus, et in eo tres 
lineas intersecantes se ad angulos rectos, in qua sectione posito pede circino 126 
describi127 poterit sphera128 intra attomum, et in sphera infinitos circulos et omnia 
corpora sphere inscriptibilia, et in circulis omnes figuras inscriptabiles circulis, que 
sunt infinite. Videbitque racio quod supra quamlibet illarum infinitarum figurarum 
potest erigi sciencia demonstrativa. Invenietque in attomo descripcionem infinite 
sciencie, non solum de magnitudinibus, sed eciam de numeris. Cum igitur invenerit 
racio attomum factum ex nichilo ab infinita potencia, videritque in attomo 
descripcionem infinite sciencie, perpendet eandem infinitam potenciam descripsisse 
in attomo a se facto infinitam scienciam. Sed non posset infinitam scienciam 
describere nisi per infinitam sapienciam. Videbit ergo infinitam potenciam fecisse 
attomum per infinitam sapienciam. 
 
Enquiring reason will see that power can be measured as a proportion of the [value 
of the work] done to the means by which it is done. For the power of any agent 
equals the extent to which what is done exceeds that by which it is done. Every 
 
126  circino] circum eG. In this sentence, Holcot’s version of this passage produces a better text 
than the one printed in the eG. 
127  describi] describere eG 
128  sphera] spheram eG 
single thing, however, no matter how wretched and small, exceeds nothing to any 
infinite extent. Therefore when reason discovers an atom to be something [created] 
out of nothing, and it proceeds from this to the power of its producer, and, having 
measured it as a proportion of what is done to the means by which it is done, it will 
see that an atom could only emerge into being as a result of a power that is nothing 
less than infinite. Thus the emergence of an atom into being something out of 
nothing is a model of the infinite power of its producer. 
Likewise, consideration by reason will discover that an atom is a body, and that 
within it there are three lines intersecting at right angles. With the foot of the 
compasses placed at this point, a sphere can be drawn within the atom, and inside 
the sphere an infinite number of circles and all the bodies of the sphere that can be 
drawn, and in the circles every shape that can be drawn in circles, and the number of 
these is infinite. Reason will see that any one of these innumerable shapes will 
support a demonstrable [understanding of] knowledge. And it will discover in the 
atom a description of infinite knowledge, not just as regards magnitudes, but also 
numbers. Since therefore reason will have found that [even] an atom made out of 
nothing requires infinite power, and sees in an atom a description of infinite 
knowledge, it might consider the very description of that same infinite knowledge by 
means of an atom as itself amounting to infinite knowledge. But infinite knowledge 
could not be described except by infinite wisdom. Reason will therefore see that the 
atom has been created by infinite power [only] by means of infinite wisdom. 
 
